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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONCERN OF MISCONDUCT IN CAPITAL CASES
It is [the prosecutor's] duty to see that the legal rights of the
accused, as well as those of the commonwealth, are fully
protected; to prosecute and not persecute; to conduct [onesel]
with due regard to the proprieties of the office. [A prosecutor]
represents the people of the state, and in a degree should look
after the rights of a person accused of a crime by endeavoring to
protect the innocent and seeing that truth and right shall
prevail. 1
1. Bennett v. Commonwealth, 28 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Ky. Ct. App. 1930) (citations
omitted).
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Prosecutors bear a heavy responsibility in capital cases, and codes of
professional responsibility recognize the core role of prosecutors. The
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct note the important obligation prosecutors have to
seek justice and not just to act as advocates.2 The Supreme Court has
emphasized that the interest of the government "in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." 3 Fortunately,
most prosecutors take their special legal, ethical, and moral obligations
as to seek justice seriously,4 "which is most certainly a difficult duty to
be carried out carefully and cautiously."5
Ethical lawyers are concerned about any type of lawyer misconduct
in criminal cases. 6 When the participants in the criminal justice system-
2. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980) (indicating that the duty
of the public prosecutor "is to seek justice, not merely to convict"); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (1983) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of
justice and not simply that of an advocate."). See also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
§ 3-1.2(c) (1993) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.");
NATIONAL DISTRICT ATFORNEYS ASSOCIATION PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1.1 ("The
primary responsibility of prosecution is to see that justice is accomplished.").
3. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("it is as much his [or her] duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one."). See also Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (noting that in criminal trials "we have held the prosecution to
uniquely high standards of conduct"); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648-49
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The function of the prosecutor under the Federal
Constitution is not to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall. His function is
to vindicate the right of people as expressed in the laws and give those accused of crime a
fair trial.").
4. See, e.g., Warren Diepraam, Prosecutorial Misconduct: It Is Not the Prosecutor's
Way, 47 S. TEx. L. REV. 773 (2006) (stating that "hiding exculpatory evidence is not the
way of the professional prosecutor").
5. Jeschke v. State, 642 P.2d 1298, 1303 (Wyo. 1982) (citing Valerio v. State, 527
P.2d 154, 157 (1974)) (holding that prosecutor's impermissible comments to jury did not
constitute plain error requiring reversal). For a discussion of the development of the role
of public prosecutors and of prosecutor ethics, see Peter A. Joy, The Relationship
Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a
Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 409-16 (2006) (discussing studies of persons
exonerated by DNA evidence).
6. See, e.g., HARMFUL ERROR: INVESTIGATING AMERICA'S LOCAL PROSECUTORS
(Report of the Center for Public Integrity) (2003) (finding reversals on prosecutor
misconduct grounds in more than 2000 cases since 1970 and finding improper prosecutor
conduct that is harmless in thousands more during the same time period). Responsible
lawyers often are concerned about how to address a culture that may focus on winning
rather than on fairness and justice. Such a goal-oriented focus can create bad examples
for all types of lawyers. Prosecutors, however, face special responsibilities to serve
justice, so when a rogue prosecutor violates her or his ethical duties to achieve a
conviction and death sentence, such actions create numerous problems. This concern is of
special significance during a time when the public, politicians, and lawyers have become
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whether they are incompetent defense counsel, biased judges, or
overzealous prosecutors-fail to serve their important roles, the system
breaks down.7 As one judge noted, when a prosecutor, "with enormous
resources at his or her disposal, abuses this power and ignores ethical
standards, he or she not only undermines the public trust, but inflicts
damage beyond calculation to our system of justice."8 All lawyers should
be troubled by any type of misconduct that affects basic notions of
fairness, due process issues, and ethical concerns. Thus, lawyers must act
responsibly to ensure that the participants are fulfilling their roles.
Further, in capital cases where the stakes are so high, there exists a
special concern when prosecutors abuse this trust.9 The prosecutor's role
is especially important in death penalty cases because the prosecutor is a
determining force in the decision of whether a human being lives or
dies.'0 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted that
"[t]he sentencing phase of a death penalty trial is one of the most critical
proceedings in our criminal justice system,"" so a capital "prosecutor
has a heightened duty to refrain from conduct designed to inflame the
sentencing jury's passions and prejudices."12
Yet, instances of prosecutor misconduct occur in capital cases
around the country. 13 Although there are limited national studies on
increasingly troubled about the use of the death penalty in the United States. See, e.g.,
Julie Cart, Impending Execution Trends, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, at Al (noting that
Gallup polls showed a drop in support for the death penalty from eighty percent in 1994
to sixty-five percent in 2000); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The
Death Penalty Moratorium Movement in the United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 39-43
(2002).
7. "When prosecutors betray their solemn obligations and abuse the immense power
they hold, the fairness of our entire system of justice is called into doubt and public
confidence in it is undermined." Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 991 (9th Cir. 2005)
(finding constitutional violation where prosecutor did not reveal details of a deal made
with testifying co-defendant).
8. In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D. N.M. 1992) (finding that prosecutor was not
entitled to prosecutorial immunity in state bar disciplinary action).
9. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (noting in capital case
that because "death is a different kind of punishment from any other" there must be
special efforts to ensure the death penalty is imposed fairly).
10. "The prosecutor has a great deal of discretion, and in many areas a prosecutor
exercises this discretion with little or no oversight or transparency." Joy, supra note 5, at
421.
11. Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1541 (3d Cir. 1991).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing
Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct With Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
851, 890 (1995) ("Prosecutor misconduct is readily apparent to any lawyer who keeps
abreast of appellate review of criminal convictions. Case after case demonstrates the
1330 [Vol. 55:1327
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exactly how often prosecutor misconduct occurs in capital cases
compared to other cases,' 4 a percentage of capital cases do involve
serious misconduct. 5 In 1999, the Chicago Tribune did a study of 381
murder convictions that were reversed because of prosecutor misconduct
since 1963, and sixty-seven of those cases involved defendants who had
been sentenced to death.' 6 In 2000, the Cincinnati Enquirer published an
article about fourteen local capital cases involving evidence of
prosecutor misconduct.' 7 Other studies have found that prosecutor
misconduct has contributed to innocent defendants being sentenced to
death. 8
persistent reoccurrence of misconduct, such as forensic misconduct and prosecutorial
disclosure violations.").
14. Rachel E. Leonard, Seven Who Are No Longer on Death Row, SPARTANBURG
HERALD JOURNAL (SC), Sept. 3, 2006, available at http://www.goupstate.com/article-
/20060903/NEWS/-609030337 (noting that "[s]tatistics on the average number of death
penalty cases overturned because of misconduct by prosecutors are hard to come by").
15. Although most prosecutors do act ethically, any instances of prosecutor
misconduct where life is at stake are too many instances. See James S. Liebman, et al., A
Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, app. at C-2 to C-4 (2000). The
study found that prosecutor suppression of evidence accounted for sixteen percent of
reversals, and other prosecutor and law enforcement misconduct accounted for an
additional three percent. Id. at C-4. Ineffective assistance of defense counsel accounted
for thirty-seven percent of reversals. Id. There continue to be reports of "major instances
of misconduct by government lawyers in death penalty cases." Kim Wherry Toryanksi,
No Ordinary Party: Prosecutorial Ethics and Errors in Death Penalty Cases, 54 FED.
LAWYER 45 (2007). Of course, the actual number of instances of prosecutor misconduct
occurring during the last few years is unknown, because most allegations of prosecutor
misconduct in capital cases are not discovered or resolved until after a large number of
years of investigation and litigation through state post-conviction and federal habeas
corpus review. For example, in the case of Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), it
took nearly twenty years between the time of the acts of misconduct and the time that
litigation on the issue was resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court. In the Kevin Peasley case
discussed later in this Article, it took nearly ten years between the egregious misconduct
and the time that Mr. Peasley was disbarred. See In re Peasley, 90 P.3d 764, 767 (Ariz.
2004).
16. Anthony Brian Bush, Note, Capital Punishment: Advocates' Deadly Combination
of Inadequacy and Misconduct, 12 JONES L. REV. 197, 216 (2008) (citing Ken Armstrong
& Maurice Possley, Trial & Error; How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win; The
Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, §1, at 1).
17. See Spencer Hunt, Clouded Cases, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 10, 2000, at Al.
18. Id. at 216 (citing Center for Public Integrity, Harmful Error: Investigating
America's Local Prosecutors, 45-47, at 92-107 (2003); BARRY SCHECK, ET AL, ACTUAL
INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY
CONVICTED, app. 2 at xiv (2000)). See id. at 218 (discussing role of prosecutor
misconduct leading to execution of possibly innocent defendants Carlos DeLuna and
Larry Griffin). See also Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous
Convictions Are Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 481 (1996) (discussing
prosecutor misconduct and wrongful convictions in capital cases). Considering all
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In some death penalty cases extra scrutiny may lower the risk of
intentional misconduct, while in other cases there may be more
community pressure on the attorneys to bend the rules to achieve a
conviction and a death sentence for a heinous crime. 19 One review of
capital cases in California found that capital cases "present unique risks
because of the pressures to engage in misconduct in death penalty
cases." 20 One state supreme court justice was puzzled about the reasons
for prosecutor misconduct in capital cases, stating, "Why we see a
continuing pattern of prosecutorial misconduct in capital cases is beyond
me.' Whatever the cause, it is the duty of all ethical lawyers in the bar
to work to do everything they can to limit instances of egregious
misconduct in every single case where lives are at stake.
Although commentators have and continue to address the problem of
prosecutor misconduct in criminal cases, relatively little has been written
that focuses specifically on prosecutor misconduct in capital cases.22 This
Article examines some of the common types of prosecutor misconduct
that may occur in capital cases,23 and the main focus is on how to address
criminal cases, "prosecutorial misconduct has proven to be one of the most common
factors that causes or contributes to wrongful convictions." Joy, supra note 5, at 403
(discussing studies of persons exonerated by DNA evidence).
19. Professor Alafair Burke has written about how various cognitive phenomena may
affect prosecutors in a way that impairs their ability to see certain evidence. Alafair
Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. &
LIBERTY 512, 513 (2007) (noting that "[b]ecause confirmation bias leads individuals to
seek out and prefer information that tends to confirm whatever hypothesis they are
testing, a prosecutor reviewing a file to determine a suspect's guilt would be inclined to
look only for evidence that supports a theory of guilt").
20. Natasha Minsker, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, 45 CAL. W.
L. REV. 373, 400 (2009) (noting that "[t]here is a unique risk in these cases that
misconduct will influence the jury on the issue of sentence"). See also James S. Liebman,
The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2129 (2000) (discussing that
prosecutors have strong incentives to seek death sentences); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a
Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 355, 388-89 (2001)
(explaining institutional pressures on prosecutors).
21. State v. Lorraine, 613 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ohio 1993) (Wright, J., concurring).
22. One commentator has noted the dearth of scholarly articles about prosecutorial
ethics in capital cases. Minsker, supra note 20, at 400. See, e.g., Edward C. Brewer, III,
Let's Play Jeopardy: Where the Question Comes After the Answer for Stopping
Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death-Penalty Cases, 28 N. Ky. L. REV. 34 (2000).
23. There are, of course, other types of misconduct by attorneys that jurisdictions
should consider. See, e.g., Symposium, Judging Justly? Judicial Responsibility for
Addressing Incompetent Counsel and Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases,
20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 21 (2003) (discussing different types of misconduct by
prosecutors and defense attorneys); Welsh White, Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct in
Capital Cases: Imposing Prohibitions on Improper Penalty Trial Arguments, 39 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1147, 1149 (2002) (discussing use of improper closing arguments);
Michael B. Shortnacy, Guilty and Gay, A Recipe for Execution in American Courtrooms:
1332 [Vol. 55:1327
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egregious misconduct, not mere attorney errors.24 The Article considers
four areas of prosecutor misconduct, and in each of these sections, we
briefly discuss the law regarding that type of misconduct, and then
discuss specific examples of that type of misconduct in capital cases.
Instances of prosecutor misconduct may occur prior to trial during
discovery, during jury selection, and during trial and post-trial.25 In Part
I, we discuss situations where prosecutors withhold exculpatory evidence
from defendants in capital cases. This type of misconduct often rises to
the level of constitutional violations under Brady v. Maryland.26 In Part
II, we discuss the problem where prosecutors improperly use pretrial
publicity to achieve convictions and death sentences in capital cases.
Misconduct also may occur during jury selection, and in Part III we
examine situations where some prosecutors have improperly used
peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based upon race.
Under Batson v. Kentucky,27 this type of prosecutor misconduct also may
rise to constitutional significance. Next, in Part IV, we consider the trial
itself and discuss situations where capital prosecutors improperly use
false evidence or statements.
In Part V, we address methods for deterring and remedying
prosecutor misconduct in capital cases. We consider three different
categories of solutions: (1) institutional and systemic methods of
preventing prosecutor misconduct; (2) punishment of individual
prosecutors responsible for egregious misconduct; and (3) remedies for
defendants who are victims of misconduct. In each category, we discuss
suggestions that have been made by various commentators. The Article
Sexual Orientation as a Tool for Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, 51
AM. U. L. REV. 309, 317 (2001) (noting that use of jury arguments that stereotype and
degrade homosexuals "are all too common occurrences in death penalty cases in the
United States").
24. Some of the suggested remedies, such as improved training, could also be used to
prevent attorney errors. But the main focus here is on the concern of egregious
misconduct. Recently, the American Bar Association Criminal Justice section recently
passed a recommendation to urge "courts to distinguish between attorney misconduct and
attorney error." American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Report to the House
of Delegates, Recommendation, at I (August 2009), available at http://www.abanet.org-
/leadership/2009/annual/summary of recommendations/OneHundredEleven_A.DOC
(last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
25. The Supreme Court has defined "prosecutorial misconduct" as when a prosecutor"oversteps the bounds of that propriety and fairness which should characterize the
conduct of such an officer in the prosecution of a criminal offense." Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 84 (1935).
26. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
27. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2009] 1333
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
concludes with five specific proposals for taking steps toward addressing
prosecutor misconduct in capital cases.
II. BRADYv. MARYLAND AND THE FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE IN CAPITAL CASES
One type of misconduct occurs when prosecutors withhold
exculpatory evidence in capital cases. The Supreme Court has held that it
violates the constitution when prosecutors withhold evidence that
exculpates or reduces the penalty for a defendant because such action by
a prosecutor "casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a
proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice. 28 These
types of violations are among the most common of all constitutional
criminal procedural violations.29 Below, this Article discusses the legal
and ethical standards regarding exculpatory evidence. Then, it gives
several examples of capital cases where exculpatory evidence was
withheld in capital cases.
A. Legal and Ethical Standards Regarding Exculpatory Evidence
When the powerfil government, with all of its resources, withholds
helpful evidence from an individual defendant, it creates an unfair trial
and may rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 30 In the capital case
of Brady v. Maryland,31 the United States Supreme Court held that when
a defendant requests favorable evidence, a prosecutor's failure to turn
over such evidence violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 32 Later cases explain that even if the defendant does not
request such information, a prosecutor's failure to turn over material
exculpatory evidence violates due process.33 Further, in capital cases,
Brady applies to evidence that is material "either to guilt or to
punishment," and thus in capital cases Brady evidence includes a broad
28. Brady, 373 U.S. at 88.
29. See Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors
Play, CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 533 (2007).
30. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674 (1985); United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976) (holding that there is a duty to disclose exculpatory
information even if defense does not make specific request).
1334 [Vol. 55:1327
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range of mitigating evidence and other capital sentencing phase
evidence.
34
There are some hurdles for defendants to gain relief in cases
involving Brady violations. In the non-capital cases Smith v. Phillips35
and United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,36 the Court clarified that it
would not articulate specific standards for responsible prosecutor
conduct when it declined to consider prosecutors' motives in the
constitutional analysis of Brady violations.3 7
Further, in United States v. Bagley,38 the Court held that there is not a
remedy for a prosecutor's intentional failure to disclose requested
information unless there is a "reasonable probability" that had the
evidence been disclosed, the outcome of the criminal proceeding would
have been different.39 In the capital case of Kyles v. Whitley,4 ° the Court
explained that materiality is met when "the favorable evidence could
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict."' Thus, under the Federal
Constitution, even if an appellate court holds that a prosecutor did not
disclose certain exculpatory evidence at trial, the case may not be
34. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004). Brady also applies to
impeachment evidence. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667. An individual prosecutor also has a duty to
learn of favorable evidence known to police and others acting on the government's behalf
in the case. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
35. 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).
36. 458 U.S. 858, 873 (1982).
37. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITr. L. REV. 393, 436-37
(1992). In limited situations, the prosecutor's bad faith in withholding evidence may be
legally relevant, but the Court's standard makes it difficult to prove. Id. at 439-40.
38. 473 U.S. at 682. The crimes in Bagley involved charges of violating federal
narcotics and firearms laws. Id. at 669.
39. Id. Once Brady material is discovered after conviction, assuming a court is not
procedurally barred from reviewing the issue, "a court addressing the merits of a Brady
claim must answer three questions: (1) Did the prosecutor suppress evidence? (2) Was
the evidence favorable to the accused? (3) Was the suppression prejudicial to the
accused?" Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland, supra note 29, at 537. Similarly, in
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999), the Court stated the three elements of a
Brady prosecutorial misconduct claim: "The evidence at issue must be favorable to the
accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must
have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must
have ensued." See also Dretke, 540 U.S. at 691 (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82).
40. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
41. Id. at 434-35 (explaining that "[t]he question is not whether the defendant would
more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in
its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence"). See also Dretke, 540 U.S. at 698-99 (granting certificate of appealability in
capital defendant's habeas corpus case based upon a Brady claim).
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reversed, despite the ethics violation, because the exculpatory evidence
was not "material., ' 2
States, however, may provide more protection to defendants under
state constitutions. For example, the New York Court of Appeals has
interpreted the New York State Constitution to reject the Bagley standard
and apply a more protective standard for Brady violations where there
was a specific request for the material.43
In addition to constitutional requirements, the duty of prosecutors to
turn over exculpatory evidence is emphasized in professional ethical and
disciplinary rules in each state and the District of Columbia." Similarly,
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct require a prosecutor to turn over exculpatory
evidence.45 Further, the American Bar Association Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has concluded that Rule 3.8 of
42. This additional hurdle for capital defendants, that they must show materiality,
results in prosecutors "increasingly 'play[ing] the odds' that their suppression of
important items of evidence will be viewed retrospectively by a reviewing court as not
material and therefore not a violation of Brady." Gershman, Litigating Brady v.
Maryland, supra note 29, at 550. Another commentator has argued that "the caveat in
Brady that prosecutors must disclose exculpatory evidence only when it is 'material
either to guilt or to punishment' has hindered defendants' access to the kind of
exculpatory evidence whose disclosure Brady held to be fundamental to due process."
Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 483 (2009).
43. See People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1990) (applying the standard set out
in Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110-11); Gershman, The New Prosecutors, supra note 37, at 437-
38; People v. Cesar G, 584 N.Y.S.2d 383 (Crim. Ct. 1991); People v. Cabon, 560
N.Y.S.2d 370 (Crim. Ct. 1990).
44. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the
Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 430-31 (2001); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary
Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693,
693-94 (1987).
45. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (2004); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2004):
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: . . .make timely disclosure to the
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with
sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged
mitigating information known to the prosecutor except when the prosecutor is
relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.
Id. See also ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.11 (a)
(1993); Lisa Kurcias, Note, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1206 (2000); Casey P. McFaden, Current Developments 2000-
2001: Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1211, 1224-28 (2001); Kevin
C. McMunigal, Are Prosecutorial Ethics Standards Different?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
1453, 1462-68 (2000) (discussing disclosure rules for prosecutors).
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the Model Rules creates a more demanding obligation on prosecutors
than the constitutional obligations of Brady.4 6
B. Examples of Capital Cases Where Exculpatory Evidence Was
Withheld
Despite these cases and rules, "Brady violations are among the most
common forms of prosecutorial misconduct. ''47 Professor Bennett
Gershman has written that "[p]rosecutors have violated [Brady's]
principles so often that it stands more as a landmark to prosecutorial
indifference and abuse than a hallmark of justice. ' 48
One study estimates that Brady violations are responsible for
approximately sixteen percent of reversals in capital cases. 49 Because
Brady obligations cover mitigating evidence in capital cases, as well as
guilt-phase evidence, a number of reversals occur due to suppression of
mitigating evidence as well as suppression of exculpatory evidence.50
There are several explanations for the occurrence of Brady violations in
capital cases, 51 and it should be noted that some nondisclosures are
inadvertent rather than intentional egregious misconduct.
Still, prosecutors who do not disclose evidence face a low risk of
being penalized. Studies have shown that prosecutors are rarely
46. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof'i Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454
(2009). See Eileen Libby, A Higher Law, ABA JOURNAL, Oct. 2009, available at
http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/a higher law/.
47. Davis, supra note 44, at 431. See also Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a
Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory
Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 869 (1997) ("For every one of these cases, we
have every reason to suspect that there are many more in which the prosecutor's refusal
to disclose the exculpatory evidence was never discovered by the defendant or his
attorney."). Recently, the New York Times featured a story about a third North Carolina
death row inmate being released in six months in capital cases involving prosecutors or
investigators withholding exculpatory evidence. See also Shaila Dewan, Executions
Resume, As Do Questions of Fairness, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2008, at Al.
48. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland, supra note 29, at 53 1.
49. James S. Liebman, et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-
1995, app. at C-2 to C-4 (2000).
50. See James S. Liebman, et al., A Broken System Part H: Why There Is So Much
Error in Capital Cases and What Can Be Done About It, Feb. I1, 2002, available at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/index2.html (concluding that nineteen
percent of reversals occurred because of prosecutor suppression of mitigating and
exculpatory evidence).
51. One commentator has noted that the Brady rule is unusual in that "[i]t requires a
prosecutor to balance competing and contradictory objectives, and is so malleable that it
affords prosecutors an extremely broad opportunity to exercise discretion in ways that
impede - rather than promote - the search for truth." Gershman, Litigating Brady v.
Maryland, supra note 29, at 533.
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disciplined for such violations, and when they are punished, the
punishment is minor.52 Additionally, even when Brady violations are
discovered, they do not necessarily hurt a violator's career. For example,
a former Georgia prosecutor became a Congressman after he had
withheld evidence in the successful prosecution of seven men who were
later exonerated.53 Also, a former New Mexico prosecutor cited for
failing to disclose evidence in a capital case was later named chief
counsel for the state's lawyer disciplinary board.54 Misconduct has not
harmed the careers of a number of other prosecutors.55
On the other hand, in capital cases the consequences to innocent
defendants of prosecutors withholding evidence are high.56 Joseph
Brown, who went by the name of Shabaka Sundiata Waglini, came
52. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for
Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 720-29 (1987); Weeks, supra note
47, at 844-71; see also Kurcias, supra note 44, at 1219:
Even if the prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence is discovered,
the worst-case scenario for the prosecutor is that the conviction will be
overturned on appeal and the defendant will be granted a new trial, which is an
unlikely result. On the other hand, the prosecutor may fear that she will not win
a conviction if she does disclose the evidence."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
53. Penny J. White, Errors and Ethics: Dilemmas in Death, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1265,1280 (2001).
54. Id.
55. Another prosecutor who knowingly presented false evidence in a death penalty
case became a judge. See Minsker, supra note 20, at 393. In another case, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted that a prosecutor played "fast and loose" with
her ethical duties for failing to turn over exculpatory evidence in a murder case. Stephens
v. Hall, 407 F.3d 1195, 1206 (11 th Cir. 2005) (affirming conviction under a deferential
federal habeas corpus review standard despite the ethical concerns). The prosecutor in
Stephens, Nancy Grace, now has her own national television show. See CNN webpage,
http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/nancy.grace (last visited Jan. 23, 2010). Nancy
Grace's ethics as a prosecutor were questioned in other court opinions too. In Bell v.
State, the Georgia Supreme Court granted the defendant a mistrial because Nancy
Grace's statements in closing argument exceeded the scope of proper argument in that
heroin trafficking case. Bell v. State, 439 S.E.2d 480, 481 (Ga. 1994) ("By referring to
such extraneous and prejudicially inflammatory material in her closing argument, the
prosecutor exceeded the wide latitude of closing argument, to the detriment of the
accused and to the detriment of the fair administration of justice."). See also Carr v. State,
482 S.E.2d 314, 322 (Ga. 1997) ("[T]he conduct of the prosecuting attorney ...
demonstrated her disregard of the notions of due process and fairness, and was
inexcusable."). According to the Brief and Enumerations of Error in Carr, "the
prosecuting attorney engaged in an extensive pattern of inappropriate and, in some cases,
illegal conduct in the course of the trial." Brief and Enumerations of Error, Carr v. State,
1996 W 33482455, at *152-64 (July 24, 1996) (detailing Grace's role in the trial).
56. See Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV.
685, 688 (2006).
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within fifteen hours of being executed before his conviction was reversed
by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.57 In Brown v.
Wainwright,58 the court concluded that the prosecutor "knowingly
allowed material false testimony to be introduced at trial, failed to step
forward and make the falsity known, and knowingly exploited the false
testimony in its closing argument to the jury." 59 Before a new trial could
begin, the original witness admitted he had lied at the previous trial.60
"Florida, sensing it had no case, abandoned its prosecution, and Shabaka
left jail a free man, his only possessions being the clothes on his back
and his legal papers. Between the ages of 23 and 37, he had spent the
rich marrow of his youth on death row." 61
It may take more than a decade to prove misconduct. Randall Dale
Adams was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in the state of
Texas.62 At Adams' trial, the prosecutor suppressed information about a
secret deal made with a witness, as well as that witness's lengthy
criminal record.63 Ultimately, that witness was convicted of the murder. 6
The prosecutor also withheld exculpatory information about two other
witnesses. 65 Twelve years after the trial, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals found that the prosecutor "knowingly used perjured testimony
[and] ... knowingly suppressed evidence," and Adams was freed.66
A special area of concern regarding Brady violations is the
government's use of informants.67 In such cases, a prosecutor may be
57. See Gershman, The New Prosecutors, supra note 37, at 452; William Styron,
Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at 4A.
58. 785 F.2d 1457 (11 th Cir. 1986).
59. Id. at 1458.
60. See Styron, supra note 55, at 4A.
61. Id. at.
62. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, supra note 37, at 45 1.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id.; Ex Parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281, 291-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Mr.
Adams' case was the subject of the documentary film by Errol Morris. See THE THIN
BLUE LINE (Miramax Films 1988).
67. See, e.g., Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing conviction
and death sentence where prosecutors failed to disclose a substantial amount of
information about the lack of credibility of an informant who was a key witness). In
Benn, the court concluded:
[H]ere, the state failed to take any measures to safeguard the system against
treachery. To the contrary, the state suppressed material exculpatory and
impeachment evidence that would have destroyed the credibility of its principal
witness, severely undermined its theory of motive, and left it without
substantial evidence of premeditation or an aggravating circumstance.
Id. at 1062.
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faced with a number of complicated issues.68 Cook v. State69 is an
example of government misuse of an informant in a capital case.
According to the appellate court, eighteen years after Kerry Cook's
conviction for capital murder, the state concealed evidence that
implicated other suspects, pressured a fingerprint expert to commit
perjury, and employed a jailhouse informant to testify falsely. Cook
spent three trials and twenty years on death row before he was released.7 °
There are examples of Brady violations in capital cases from across
the country.71 In 2006 in the capital case of Graves v. Dretke,72 the
68. There is a strong tension between ethics and practical considerations in the area of
the government's use of informers, particularly when the issue is the disclosure of the
identity of the person who has provided valuable incriminating evidence. Scholarly
articles and court opinions note the importance of truth-finding in the judicial process.
See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) ("Court proceedings are held for the
solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the truth which is the sine qua non of a fair
trial."); see also Douglas W. Henkin, Judicial Estoppel - Beating Shields into Swords
and Back Again, 139 U. PENN. L REv. 1711, 1730 n.124 (1991) (quoting Estes, 381 U.S.
at 540). Judges, however, realize that sometimes the truth-seeking process must give way
to more practical considerations. Despite the clear inclination for the informer to make
cases, a prosecutor may be reluctant to disclose either the existence or the identity of such
people for fear of jeopardizing the safety of the informer. Moreover, if the judicial
process uniformly disclosed the identity of informers, law enforcement would soon be
left with no one willing to risk life and limb.
69. 940 S.W.2d 623 (Texas Crim. App. 1996). See also infra Section IV.
70. Id. Cook pleaded no contest to a time-served sentence to avoid a fourth trial,
although he continued to argue he was innocent. See generally James S. Liebman, The
New Death Penalty Debate: What's DNA Got to Do With It?, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REv. 527, n.47 (2002); Evan Moore, Cloud of Doubt, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 12, 1999,
at Al8. In another case, after Clarence Brandley had been on death row for nine years,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed his conviction finding that the prosecution
had suppressed evidence and had improperly investigated the case. Ex Parte Brandley,
781 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). After holding a hearing upon Brandley's habeas
petition, the trial court observed: "The litany of events graphically described by the
witnesses, some of it chilling and shocking, leads me to the conclusion the pervasive
shadow of darkness has obscured the light of fundamental decency and human rights. I
can only sadly state justice has been on trial here, but of more significance, injustice has
been on trial." Id. at 887. See also In re Womack, 541 So. 2d 47, 62 (Ala. 1988) (finding
in a capital case that district attorney's office had failed to disclose exculpatory evidence
that it had a plea bargain with a critical prosecution witness).
71. See, e.g., Reasonover v. Washington, 60 F. Supp. 2d 937, 981 (E.D. Mo. 1999)
(vacating conviction for capital murder where prosecutor failed to turn over tapes of
contradicting conversations made by witnesses and to disclose that witnesses received
deals to testify); Conyers v. State, 790 A.2d 15, 41 (Md. 2002) (remanding for a new trial
where the state failed to disclose information about a favorable plea agreement deal made
with a key witness in the capital case); Dewan, supra note 47, at Al (discussing three
North Carolina death row inmates recently being released in cases involving prosecutors
withholding evidence).
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that a
prosecutor who did not disclose statements by a key witness violated
Brady.7 3 In 2005 in Silva v. Brown,74 another capital case, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the prosecution
violated Brady for not revealing the full details of a deal with a testifying
co-defendant. 75 In addition to federal court decisions, in recent years,
several state courts have found Brady violations in capital cases.7 6 For
example, in 2001, a Florida circuit court judge overturned Rudolph
Holton's capital conviction because prosecutors withheld police reports
and other evidence favorable to Holton.77 Holton was released from
71prison in 2003 after spending sixteen years on death row.
In areas involving government suppression of exculpatory evidence,
prosecutors are faced with a number of conflicting pressures that may
lead to injustices in some capital cases. In addition to situations where
prosecutors make errors, prosecutors face pressures and incentives to
obtain convictions and death sentences against defendants who appear to
be guilty of heinous crimes. Ethical prosecutors, those who train
72. Graves v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 334, 344-45 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
374 (2006).
73. Id.
74. 416 F.3d 980, 991 (9th Cir. 2005).
75. Id.
76. See Riddle v. Ozmint, 631 S.E.2d 70 (S.C. 2006) (finding Brady violation in
capital case where prosecution failed to disclose inconsistent statement from the key
witness and failed to disclose that officers took the key witness to the scene of the murder
for a reenactment); Simpson v. Moore, 627 S.E.2d 701 (S.C. 2006) (finding Brady
violation in capital case based upon a robbery-murder where prosecution failed to
disclose that a bag of money was found behind a convenience store counter); Schofield v.
Palmer, 621 S.E.2d 726 (Ga. 2005) (finding violation in a capital case where the
prosecution suppressed evidence that the Georgia Bureau of Investigation paid a witness
for providing information against the petitioner); Tillman v. State, 128 P.3d 1123 (Utah
2005) (reversing death sentence where the State had represented that witness interviews
had not been recorded and then, following federal habeas corpus proceedings, the petition
discovered partial transcripts of pre-trial interviews with the State's key witness); Floyd
v. State, 902 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 2005) (finding Brady violation in a capital case where
prosecution suppressed statements of a witness); Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 2d 161 (Fla.
2004) (finding Brady violation in capital case where prosecution failed to turn over a date
book that contradicted part of key witness's testimony).
77. See David Karp, Off Death Row After 16 Years, ST. PETERSBURG (FLORIDA)
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2003, at I B.
78. Id. In New York, the non-capital murder conviction of Eric Jackson was vacated
because the prosecutor had concealed evidence that the deadly fire was caused by an
electrical malfunction. People v. Jackson, 538 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. 1988). If New
York had the death penalty statute at the time like other states that allow the death penalty
for felony murder, Jackson might have ended up on death row. Gershman, The New
Prosecutors, supra note 37, at 452-53.
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prosecutors, the courts, and legislatures must consider ways to help the
lawyers balance these pressures, avoid mistakes, and preserve the goals
of justice. The remedies section discusses some suggestions for
addressing this problem.
III. PUBLICITY AND CAPITAL TRIALS
Legal experts and psychologists have long recognized the potential
effects of pretrial publicity on jurors,79 and so attorneys have special
responsibilities to mitigate these effects. The ABA Standards provide
that a prosecutor should not make or authorize statements outside the
courtroom that will be publicly disseminated "if the prosecutor knows or
reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of
prejudicing a criminal proceeding." 80 The standard also gives prosecutors
the responsibility to make sure that such statements are not made by
investigators and law enforcement personnel. 81 Below is a discussion of
the legal standards involving pretrial publicity and a discussion of two
recent murder trials that featured extensive media coverage.
A. Supreme Court Decisions and Ethical Rules About Pretrial Publicity
Publicity may affect jurors and the fairness of trials. As the Supreme
Court has noted, "Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through
the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper." 82 The Court
has insisted that no one be punished for a crime without "a charge fairly
made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion,
excitement, and tyrannical power., 83
A leading United States Supreme Court case on the prejudicial effect
of pretrial publicity is Sheppard v. Maxwell.84 The defendant in Maxwell,
Dr. Sam Sheppard, became the quintessential tabloid villain and the basis
for the long-running television show85 and a movie.86 Although Sheppard
79. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the 'CSI Effect'
Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1336-37
(2009); Christina A. Studebaker & Steven D. Penrod, Pretrial Publicity: The Media, the
Law and Common Sense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 428, 433 (1997); Amy L. Otto et
al., The Biasing Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Judgments, 18 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 453, 454 (1994).
80. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION, § 3-1.4(a), 12-13 (3d ed. 1993).
81. Id. at 3-1.4(b).
82. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941).
83. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S 227, 236-37 (1940).
84. 384 U.S. 333, 354 (1966).
85. THE FUGITIVE (ABC Television; Quinn Martin Productions 1963-1967)
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ultimately was not sentenced to death following his first trial and
conviction, the public's attention on the trial led the Supreme Court to
note that the trial involved a "notorious case" with "virulent publicity." 87
Not only was "[t]he inquest ... televised from a high school gymnasium,
but the prosecutor and the judge in the trial were involved in elections for
judgeships at the time.88 The Supreme Court detailed the abuses and their
potential effects: "The prosecution repeatedly made evidence available to
the news media which was never offered in the trial. Much of the'evidence' disseminated in this fashion was clearly inadmissible. The
exclusion of such evidence in court is rendered meaningless when news
media make it available to the public." 89
In asserting that due process requires that the accused receive a fair
trial by a jury free from improper influences, the Supreme Court reversed
the conviction, placing blame on numerous parties. 90 The Court noted
that "[h]ad the judge, the other officers of the court, and the police placed
the interest of justice first, the news media would have soon learned to be
content with the task of reporting the case as it unfolded in the courtroom
-- not pieced together from extrajudicial statements." 9'
In determining whether misconduct and pretrial publicity have
deprived the defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial before an
impartial jury, courts usually consider whether the defendant can make a
showing that the jurors who tried the case were actually prejudiced
against the defendant and whether the defendant used sufficient means of
requesting relief at the trial level.92 Courts may find prejudice,
86. TIE FUGITIVE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1993).
87. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 354.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 360. The Court explained that the "report that there was a 'bombshell
witness on tap' who would testify as to Sheppard's 'fiery temper' could only have
emanated from the prosecution." Id. at 361.
90. Id. at 361-62. "The fact that many of the prejudicial news items can be traced to
the prosecution, as well as the defense, aggravates the judge's failure to take any action."
Id. at 361 (citing Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
91. Id. at 362. Although the judicial system could remove Sam Sheppard's
conviction, it could not remove the stigma which, unlike in the television and movie
fictions, caused Sheppard's life to fall apart. See, e.g., Sam Reese Sheppard: Seeking the
Truth, available at http://www.samreesesheppard.org/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
92. Jane C. Avery, Federal Prosecutor's Pretrial Statements as Affecting Defendant's
Right to Fair Trial, 22 A.L.R. FED. 556, 559 (2004) (discussing various cases and the
facts that have been considered in establishing prejudice and whether defendants were
denied fair trials because of pretrial publicity).
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when the trial is conducted in a circus-like atmosphere, where
the actual jurors possess fixed opinions that prevent them from
judging impartially the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
where inflammatory publicity so saturates a community that it is
almost impossible to draw an impartial jury, or where so many
jurors admit to a disqualifying prejudice that the trial court may
legitimately doubt the avowals of impartiality by the remaining
jurors.
9 3
In rare situations, a court may presume prejudice. 94 In the capital
case of Chapman v. California, the Supreme Court discussed harmless
error analysis in another context but noted, "[t]o try a defendant in a
community that has been exposed to publicity highly adverse to the
defendant is per se ground for reversal of his conviction; no showing
need be made that the jurors were in fact prejudiced against him." 95
But in most cases of prosecutor misconduct, courts require the
defendant to show that there was prejudice before receiving a remedy. 96
One recent case noted that the Supreme Court has not found a case of
presumed prejudice since 1966. 97 In another case, a district court judge
stated that to reverse decisions without a showing of prejudice would
give defendants a "'windfall' by dismissing the indictment simply
because some unidentified and possibly low-level member of the
prosecutor's office failed to adhere to his duty." 98
Ethics rules also address the concerns of pretrial publicity. Rule 3.6
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct applies to all lawyers
involved in a case and prohibits a lawyer from making an extrajudicial
93. 21 A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 932 (2009).
94. See Thirty-Sixth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, Influences on the Jury, 36
GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 560, n. 1734 (2007).
95, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 43-44 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(discussing harmless error review for claims of federal constitutional error) (citing
Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 351-52).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 510 F. Supp. 323, 326-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(quoting United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 299 (7th Cir. 1978)). The court
explained:
[T]he defendants' allegation that the generation of publicity was intentional
misconduct, even if true, does not merit a dismissal of these indictments. The
purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to secure a fair trial for the accused. To
dismiss the indictments here in the absence of any showing of prejudice would
not further this purpose, but rather would constitute a "punishment of society
for misdeeds of a prosecutor."
Id. at 327.
97. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1182 (10th Cir. 1998).
98. Myers, 510 F. Supp. at 326.
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public statement "that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will
be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding in the matter." 99 Rule 3.6 lists some topics that are likely to
have a prejudicial effect if discussed publicly prior to trial, such as
credibility of witnesses, the possibility of a plea, test results, opinion as
to guilt, and inadmissible evidence.100
Other ethical rules specifically focus on prosecutors and pretrial
publicity. Model Rule 3.8(g) restricts prosecutors from making
extrajudicial statements except for statements that are necessary to
inform the public and that serve a "legitimate law enforcement
purpose."'' Model Rule 3.8(e) requires prosecutors to "exercise
reasonable care" to make sure that people who work with the prosecutor,
such as investigators, also do not make extrajudicial statements that the
prosecutor could not make.'0 2 In the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, Model Code DR 7-107 puts similar limitations on
attorneys in criminal cases. 10 3
Because of the difficulty in establishing prejudice after the trial, the
best strategy for courts dealing with the issue is to try to lessen the
impact of pretrial publicity through the jury selection process. 0 4 If an
unbiased panel cannot be found, a change of venue becomes the
accused's remedy. But Sheppard took place in a different information
era. Cable news, the Internet, and 24-hour instantaneous availability of
information did not exist. For example, one recent study has found that
today "Americans spend '40 percent of all hours, including sleep time,"'
with access to media. 0 5 Thus, potential jurors and witnesses may have an
almost constant access to information outside the courthouse about a
99. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a). Rule 3.6 lists some information that
may be released, and it also has an exception where the information is released in
response to other prejudicial information. See id. R. 3.6(c).
100. See id. R. 3.6.
10 1. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f).
102. Id.
103. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR. 7-107.
104. See, e.g., Susan Hanley Duncan, Pretrial Publicity in High Profile Trials: An
Integrated Approach to Protecting the Right to a Fair Trial and the Right to Privacy, 34
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 755, 767 (2008) ("One of the primary and preferred remedies for
pretrial publicity remains the process of voir dire."). Professor Duncan, however, notes
that studies "call into question whether voir dire actually accomplishes its objectives." Id.
105. James R. Devine, The Duke Lacrosse Matter as a Case Study of the Right to
Reply to Prejudicial Pretrial Extrajudicial Publicity Under Rule 3.6(C), 15 VILL. SPORTS
& ENT. L. J. 175, 217 (2008) (quoting Jessica Marsden, Media Consumers Finally
Saying, "Enough!," HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 8, 2007, at A 1).
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case, and society should be increasingly concerned about attorney
misconduct that involves the use of pretrial publicity.
B. Two Recent Murder Cases With Significant Pretrial Publicity
Two recent high-profile murder cases are discussed below, one that
resulted in a prison sentence and one that resulted in an execution.
Although ultimately courts did not find legally significant misconduct in
these two cases, the cases illustrate how pretrial publicity may surround
major cases and serve as a warning about how attorneys and courts
should be vigilant in addressing pretrial publicity.
1. United States v. Kaczynski
A recent murder case that raised concerns about pretrial publicity
was the case involving Theodore Kaczynski, the "Unabomber."' 0 6
Although the defendant in the case ultimately avoided the death penalty
with a plea, 0 7 the district court noted it was a case "with intense public
interest"'10 8 and explained, "[w]hen there is a collision between the rights
of the Defendant and the right of the public to know (particularly, as
interpreted by the press) it is important to analyze the extent of those
respective rights and to reach some balance between these important
interests."' 0 9
Kaczynski moved to have his indictment dismissed, claiming the
government "deliberately leaked information regarding its investigation,"
thereby violating his rights to an unbiased grand jury and a fair trial.110
Kaczynski's attorneys acknowledged that the accused had the burden of
proof to demonstrate any unfairness, and they moved for an evidentiary
hearing "to prove that the government is in fact responsible for the'media blitz' that followed the execution of the search warrant."'' The
trial court held that the accused was required to show actual prejudice.' 12
106. United States v. Kaczynski, 923 F. Supp. 161, 163-64 (D. Mont. 1996).
107. Ted Kaczynski's brother, David, had aided federal agents in apprehending Ted as
the agents led him to believe that in return for his help prosecutors would not seek the
death penalty. See William Glaberson, The Death Penalty as a Personal Thing, NY
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/18-
/nyregion/18brother.html?r-I.
108. Kaczynski, 923 F. Supp. at 163-64.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 161.
111. Id. at 162.
112. Id. at 163.
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Regarding the potential remedy, the court refused to dismiss the
indictment and noted that "[e]ven if [the accused] were to show
prejudice, however, it is doubtful whether the proper course would be to
dismiss the indictment."'"3 Further, "'[i]f a grand jury is prejudiced by
outside sources when in fact there is insufficient evidence to indict, the
greatest safeguard to the liberty of the accused is the petit jury and the
rules governing its determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence."' 1 4
2. United States v. McVeigh
The Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995 and its investigation
generated considerable media coverage. After Timothy McVeigh's arrest
for the capital crimes, the media informed the public of details of his
personal history, including McVeigh's belief that during his tour in the
Gulf War the government had placed a microchip in his buttocks." 15
McVeigh's attorney challenged his conviction in part because "the
jury pool was flooded with negative pre-trial publicity, especially media
reports that he had confessed to his lawyers.""16 The U.S. Court of
Appeals noted the problem of changing venue due to the pre-trial
publicity because of the national attention the case received." 7 The
appeals court further considered that the district court had concluded that
McVeigh could not receive a fair trial in Oklahoma when it decided to
move the trial to Denver." 18 The court apparently recognized the venue
change did not completely eliminate the prejudice caused by the pre-trial
publicity. 11 9
Prior to McVeigh's trial, during jury selection, the Dallas Morning
News published an article on its internet page claiming that it was in
possession of "internal, confidential defense documents that revealed
McVeigh had confessed to his own lawyers that he had indeed bombed
the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City .... This story was picked up
and reported by both the national and Denver news media" and contained
113. Id.
114. Kaczynski 923 F. Supp. at 163 (quoting Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d
627, 684 (9th Cir. 1968)).
115. See Ron K. Unz, Big Brother, Meet Big Sister Immigration: Sen. Feinstein Wants
Everyone to Carry an Encrypted Database Linked National Identity Card, L.A. TIMES,
June 12, 1995, at 5; Sally Jacobs, McVeigh Lived Apart, Rooted in Weapons, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 10, 1995, at 1.
116. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1179 (10th Cir. 1998).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1179-80. Denver was seen as a large metropolitan area where a "large jury
pool is available." Id. at 1179.
119. Id. at 1180. The court concluded that the citizens of Denver were less "intensely
affected" by the horrific criminal acts alleged. Id.
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other information about his plans and motivations.120 Two weeks later,
another similar article appeared on the Playboy website.' 21 Four of the
seated jurors acknowledged that they were aware of the reports of
McVeigh's alleged confession.' 22
The Circuit Court of Appeals rejected McVeigh's argument that the
court should presume prejudice because of the coverage, and noted that
such a presumption is "rarely invoked and only in extreme situations."' 2 3
Referring to Sheppard, the court held that "[i]n order for the reviewing
court to reach a presumption that inflammatory pretrial publicity so
permeated the community as to render impossible the seating of an
impartial jury, the court must find that the publicity in essence displaced
the judicial process, thereby denying the defendant his constitutional
right to a fair trial. 124 The court admitted that the accused's burden in
this regard will rarely be satisfied because the presumptive prejudice
standard is only used in extreme situations and the defendant bears a
heavy burden to show that the trial was unfair. 25 The court observed that
"despite the proliferation of the news media and its technology, the
Supreme Court has not found a single case of presumed prejudice in this
Country since the watershed case of Sheppard."' 26
After rejecting the defendant's argument for a presumed prejudice
standard, the court addressed whether or not there was actual prejudice.
The court noted that the standard gives deference to the trial judge: "In
reviewing for actual prejudice, we examine the circumstances of the
publicity and the voir dire, and merely determine 'whether the judge had
a reasonable basis for concluding that the jurors selected could be
impartial."" 12 7 Applying that standard, the court of appeals found that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the jury could
disregard the adverse pretrial publicity and deliver an impartial verdict.' 28
The court upheld McVeigh's conviction.' 29
120. McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1179.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1181.
123. Id. (quoting United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1177 (10th Cir. 1991)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1182.
126. McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1182.
127. Id. at 1183 (quoting Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1177-78).
128. Id. at 1183-84.129. Id. at 1222.
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3. Pretrial Publicity and Capital Cases
The McVeigh case illustrates the point that some capital cases
inherently will have extensive pretrial publicity. Since capital cases by
their nature involve horrendous crimes, they will attract attention. Even
without any misconduct, the natural reporting of news may result in
biased juries. Thus, prosecutors should be cautious about unnecessary
disclosures to the media. 1
31
But as the McVeigh and Kaczinski cases show, it is not easy for
defendants to win on claims regarding pretrial publicity.' 32 In the
McVeigh case, although the defendant could show there was pretrial
publicity, the defendant could not show prejudice. Similarly, in the
Kaczinski case, the defendant was unable to convince the court that
claims about prosecutor leaks in the case warranted relief. Kaczynski
ultimately avoided the death penalty by pleading guilty and he is
currently serving a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of
parole. 33 McVeigh was executed on June 11, 2001 at the U.S. Federal
Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana.' 34
IV. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND BA TSON v. KENTUCKY ISSUES
DURING JURY SELECTION IN CAPITAL CASES.
In addition to misconduct that may occur during discovery and
contacts with the media, prosecutor misconduct may occur during the
jury selection process. The discussion below addresses the situation
130. An upcoming capital case that will feature a large amount of publicity will be the
New York City trial of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed for his role in the Sept. I 1 attacks.
See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Accused 9/11 Mastermind to Face Civilian Trial in N. Y., NY
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/14/us/14terror.html.
131. See Laurie L. Levenson, High-Profile Prosecutors & High-Profile Conflicts, 39
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1237, 1254 (2006) ("Unnecessary disclosures [by prosecutors] may
prejudice pending investigations, taint the potential jury pool, compromise government
informants, and even endanger the lives, safety and reputation of others.").
132. Some capital cases have been reversed, based at least in part on pretrial publicity.
In Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454, 1459-60 (11 th Cir. 1991), the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit considered the combination of pretrial publicity and an inherently
prejudicial courtroom atmosphere and found that a capital defendant had been denied a
fair trial. In that case involving a defendant charged with killing a prison guard, the court
reasoned that the presence of prison guards in full uniform in the courtroom, along with
the extensive pretrial publicity, sent a message that the officers wanted the death penalty.
Id. at 1460.
133. William Glaberson, Life Without Parole For the Unabomber, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25, 1998, at 42.
134. Pam Belluck, The McVeigh Execution: The Scene; Calm at Execution Site and
Silence by McVeigh Prove Unsettling for Some, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at A27.
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where there may be instances of a prosecutor who improperly uses
peremptory challenges.
A. Legal Standard for Defendants to Make Batson Challenges to
Convictions
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that racially based
peremptory challenges by prosecutors in criminal trials violate the equal
protection clause. 135 Later Supreme Court decisions extended the Batson
rule to other "suspect" groups, 136 to civil trials, 37 and to criminal
defendants. 138
There are three steps to a Batson claim. A defendant who makes a
Batson objection must first make a showing that, based on the totality of
facts, an inference can be drawn that the peremptory challenge was made
for a discriminatory purpose. 139 Second, to overcome a showing of a
prima facie Batson violation, the prosecutor must proffer, in an
adversarial proceeding outside the jury's presence, a neutral explanation
for the challenge that demonstrates an absence of discriminatory intent.
Third, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has proved
purposeful discrimination.' 40
When the court evaluates the explanations, bare denials of a
discriminatory motive or claims of good faith will not suffice,' 41
particularly, one may suppose, in capital cases. The Supreme Court,
however, has held that a neutral explanation by the prosecutor may be
sufficient to overcome a Batson objection even if the explanation seems"implausible.' ' 142 Also, a peremptory challenge will be sustained, even if
influenced by discriminatory motives, so long as a lawful and neutral
reason for the challenge also exists.143
The Batson standard is of special concern in death penalty cases,
where several studies have concluded that race plays a significant factor
135. 476 U.S. at 82. The petitioner in Batson was indicted for second-degree burglary
and receipt of stolen goods. Id.
136. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (ethnicity); J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (gender); United States v. Somerstein, 959 F. Supp. 592
(E.D. N.Y. 1997) (religious affiliation).
137. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
138. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235
(N.Y. 1990).
139. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94.
140. Id. at 98.
141. Id.
142. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam).
143. Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1993).
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in capital sentencing. 144 A number of legal commentators argue that
Batson has failed to ensure that invidious discrimination, particularly
racial discrimination, does not taint the jury selection process. 145 This
failure is, in large part, due to procedures and standards established by
the Supreme Court for identifying, evaluating, and, if required, rejecting
peremptory challenges based on constitutionally impermissible factors
that allow lawyers, including prosecutors, to easily evade Batson's
mandate. Thus, commentators note that today, as in the past, unethical
prosecutors may use their peremptory challenges for impermissible
purposes. 146
Similarly, some state appellate courts have expressed their views on
the fitility of relying on Batson to prevent the discriminatory use of
peremptories. An Illinois appellate court referred to "the charade that has
become the Batson process,"' 147 noting that the State may use "pat race-
neutral reasons for exercise of peremptory challenges." 148
144. See, e.g., Amnesty International, United States of America: Death By
Discrimination - The Continuing Role of Race in Capital Cases (April 23, 2003),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/046/2003 (outlining recent
studies on juror racism and the effects of the race of the victim in capital sentencing);
Richard C. Dieter, The Death Penalty in Black and White: Who Lives, Who Dies, Who
Decides (Report of the Death Penalty Information Center) (June 1998), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=539; Adam Liptak, New Look
at Death Sentences and Race, N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 2008, at A10 (discussing new study
about the effects of a capital defendant's race in sentencing).
145. Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Utter Failure to
Meet the Challenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 WiS. L. REV. 501, 545
(citing People v. Boiling, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1145 (N.Y. 1992) (Bellacossa, J.,
concurring)) ("The Batson doctrine has been rendered so ineffective a tool against racism
or sexism that one jurist has been led to note that Batson and its progeny have proven to
be less an obstacle to discrimination than a roadmap to it.").
146. As one observer has noted: "Once defense counsel has made the [Batson]
objection and established a prima facie showing, prosecutorial tendering and judicial
acceptance of 'racially neutral' explanations ... has become nearly pro forma." Andrea
D. Lyon, Naming The Dragon: Litigating Race Issues During a Death Penalty Trial, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1647, 1655 (2004).
147. People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65 (I1l. App. Ct. 1996). The court speculated
that the Batson "rule would be imposed only where the prosecutor states that he does not
care to have an African-American on the jury." Id. at 66.
148. Id. at 65. Chief Judge Kaye of the Court of Appeals of New York has raised more
general concerns with the use of peremptory challenges during jury selection in arguing
that "[t]he intense focus on factors such as skin color, accent and surname in jury
selection is wholly at odds with our societal goal of dealing with people as individuals, on
their personal qualities." People v. Brown, 769 N.E.2d 1266, 1272-73 (N.Y. 2002)
(Kayne, C.J., concurring). She concluded: "My nearly 16-year experience with Batson
persuades me that, if peremptories are not entirely eliminated (as many have urged), they
should be very significantly reduced." Id. at 1273. Additionally, Chief Justice Kaye noted
that in New York, "we have both an exceedingly, perhaps uniquely, high number of
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In the non-capital case of Purkett v. Elem, the Supreme Court
reviewed peremptory challenges by the prosecution to two black jury
panel members.149 Responding to a Batson objection, the prosecution
offered as a neutral explanation the fact that the two were challenged
because they had long, curly, unkempt hair, and mustaches and goatees,
and "look[ed] suspicious.' 150 The Supreme Court held that there was no
Batson violation, setting a low standard of plausibility for evaluating the
credibility of a neutral explanation. 15' The Court stated: "This [Batson]
process [of offering a race-neutral reason in response to a Batson motion]
does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible...
the issue is the facial validity [of the explanation]. 52 After Purkett, one
commentator concluded that Purkelt "marked the final demise of the
Batson doctrine into the rule of useless symbolism."' 153
One might argue that when a trial judge concludes there is no
constitutional Batson violation, such a holding establishes that there was
no misconduct. But that argument misses the point. The fact that, in
practice, current Batson jurisprudence allows the intent of Batson to be
thwarted with ease and depressing frequency, encourages prosecutors
who might be inclined to strike jurors on impermissible grounds to do so,
since in most cases they will succeed and, in any event, there is no
downside to trying. 54 If courts and attorneys acknowledge that
attempting an impermissible strike is misconduct, even if the attempt is
unsuccessful, such acknowledgement will discourage such practices and
therefore better serve the intent and purpose of the Batson rule. In cases
where an impermissible strike is allowed to stand and the verdict is then
reversed on appeal on that ground, the fact that the trial judge reviewed
peremptory challenges, and a requirement that all peremptories be exhausted in order to
preserve a claim of error. The opportunity for mischief - let alone the huge, expensive
waste of juror time - therefore abounds." Id.
149. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 766 (noting that the respondent in the case had been
convicted of second-degree robbery).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 767.
152. Id, at 768. Even an explanation that is implausible may pass the pretextual test. Id.
Before Purkett, it was noted: "[The] lethal problem for Batson, however, is that
prosecutors have had little difficulty coming up with race-neutral explanations for their
peremptory strikes of minority jurors." Tanya Coke, Lady Justice May Be Blind, But Is
She a Soul-Sister? Race-Neutrality and the Ideal of Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 327, 377 (1994). See also Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses,
Excuses: Neutral Explanations Under Batson, 27 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM. 229, 237-66
(1993) (documenting sparse enforcement of Batson at trial).
153. Cavise, supra note 145, at 528.
154. See generally id., passim.
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and wrongly allowed the strike should have no bearing on a finding that
the prosecutor acted wrongly.
B. Batson Violations in Capital Cases
Several statistical studies have shown that the success rate of Batson
claims by criminal defendants is quite low.'55 As these studies and
observations indicate, the potential for an unethical prosecutor to commit
misconduct by striking jurors for prohibited reasons while concealing
that intent with neutral reasons is significant, given the extraordinary
range of "neutral" reasons that have been found acceptable. 156
155. See Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson's Invidious Legacy: Discriminatory Juror
Exclusion and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 336 (1993)
(analyzing seventy-six federal cases where the reason offered by the prosecutor for the
strike was rejected only three times by the trial court); see also Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson
in Practice: What Have We Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1996). In the group of cases analyzed by Prof. Melilli-all
published decisions with Batson challenges from April 30, 1986 [the date of the Batson
decision] through December 31, 1993-22% of the challenges made by criminal
defendants were successful. Id. Prof. Melilli also demonstrated that Batson challenges
based on claimed discrimination against blacks and Hispanics had a lower rate of success
than challenges based on claimed discrimination against other targeted groups. Id. at 463.
The same study showed that of 191 lawyers found to have violated the Batson rules, 165,
or over 86%, were prosecutors, a statistic the author characterized as "a dismal report
card" on a prosecutor's ethical obligation to uphold the law and seek justice. Id.
156. See, e.g., Lockett v. State, 517 So. 2d 1346 (Miss. 1987) (concerns about
sequestration); United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1988)
(particular surname); United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990) (residence);
United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1990) (recently completed jury services);
People v. Thomas, 559 N.E.2d 262 (2d Dist. 1990) (marital status); United States v.
Ferguson, 935 F.2d 862 (7th Cir. 1991) (personal encounters with the criminal justice
system); United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1991) (family member's
encounter with the criminal justice system ); United States v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 904 (10th
Cir. 1993) (juror's occupation); Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857 (3d Cir. 1994)
(language fluency); Purkett, 514 U.S. 765 (physical characteristics); United States v.
Fike, 82 F.3d 1315 (5th Cir. 1996) (distrust of the justice system), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Brown, 161 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 1998) and abrogated on other
grounds by United States v. Cantu, 230 F.3d 148 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Kelley,
140 F.3d 596 (5th Cir. 1998) (juror's health); United States v. McCoy, 848 F.2d 1476
(6th Cir. 1998) (residence); Stubbs v. Gomez, 189 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 1999) (juror's
employment status and also physical gestures). Other subjective reasons also passed
muster: Cudjoe v. Com., 475 S.E.2d 821 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (the juror did not seem
sincere); United States v. Walton, 217 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2000) (seemed "inattentive");
United States v. Hunter, 86 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 1996) (there was a "gut feeling"); Wallace
v. Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271, 1273 (11 th Cir. 1996) ("the way they answer questions was
disturbing," as was the "body language"); United States v. Hinton, 94 F.3d 397 (7th Cir.
1996); United States v. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368 (5th Cir. 1993) (the unquantifiable
"hunch").
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In capital cases, there are motivations for lawyers to use peremptory
challenges against certain categories of potential jurors. 57 Studies have
found "conspicuous evidence of racial influence in sentencing in critical
black-defendant/white-victim cases" and that both white male and female
jurors are more likely to return a death sentence than African-American
jurors in cases where the defendant is African-American and the victim
is white. 158 Other studies indicate that certain ethnic groups may be less
likely to return a death sentence, and also demonstrate a history of
disproportionate challenges against minorities by some prosecutors.' 59
Prosecutors in capital cases have used race in the attempt to obtain
death sentences. 160 For example, in 2006, in State v. McFadden, the
Missouri Supreme Court found that prosecutors used peremptory
challenges to remove five of six black potential jurors.161 The court
reversed the conviction and the death sentence.' 62
But because of the type of evidence needed for Batson violations,
such constitutional claims are difficult to establish. In the 2003 capital
157. Some prosecutors may believe that minorities harbor a distrust of the State and
police. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1611, 1640 (1985).
158. William J. Bowers, Maria Sandys and Thomas W. Brewer, Crossing Racial
Boundaries: A Closer Look at the Roots of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing When the
Defendant is Black and the Victim is White, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1497, 1501, 1532-33
(2004). See also Johnson, supra note 151, at 1619-24 (discussing data that show a
tendency among white jurors to convict black defendants more readily than white
defendants).
159. Johnson, supra note 157, at 1640. See also CATHY E. BENNETT & ROBERT
HIRSCHHORN, BENNETT'S GUIDE TO JURY SELECTION AND TRIAL DYNAMICS IN CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL LITIGATION, 324 (1993) (noting stereotypes among lawyers that African-
American and Hispanic jurors favor criminal defendants more than whites and that
Asians are more likely to convict than other ethnic groups); Charles L Lindner, Lessons
of the King Case: The Risk of Shuttle Justice, L.A.TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993 at Ml, M6
(noting that white juries are more prone to convict a black or Latino defendant than
integrated juries); HIROSHI FUKURAI, ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE, 70 (1993) (noting that prosecutors
are more likely than defense attorneys to direct peremptory challenges at minorities);
Dean E. Murphy, Case Stirs Fight on Jews, Juries and Execution, N.Y. TIMES, March 16,
2005, at Al (discussing the striking of Jewish panel members in California).
160. "Between 1997 and 2007, courts reversed or strongly suggested that reversal was
appropriate on remand in fifteen death penalty cases due to Batson violations." Adam M.
Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutor
Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1081-82 (2009). Although that number may
seem low, it reflects the hurdles to establishing a Batson violation and that Batson
violations may be procedurally defaulted in other cases. Id. at n. 129; see also Holloway
v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 7 13-18 (3d Cir. 2004) (rejecting argument by government that the
defendant had procedurally defaulted a Batson claim).
161. 191 S.W.3d 648, 657 (Mo. 2006).
162. Id.
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case of Miller-El v. Cockrell,163 evidence revealed a formal policy in the
Harris County District Attorney's office to exclude minorities from jury
service in capital cases. The evidence included a manual used by
prosecutors entitled "Jury Selection in a Criminal Case" that contained
an article by a former prosecutor outlining the reasons for excluding
minorities from jury service.' 64 Also, some prosecutors in Texas used a
procedure known as the "jury shuffle" to rearrange the order in which
members of a jury panel were examined, increasing the likelihood that"visually preferable" venire members would be moved forward and
empanelled.165
The history of the Miller-El capital case demonstrates how courts
may fail to remedy clear evidence of prosecutorial misconduct in Batson
capital cases, and how, if there is an ultimate remedy, it may take years
of litigation. Miller-El's capital trial was held before Batson was decided,
and at trial, the State removed ten of eleven prospective African-
American jurors with peremptory strikes.' 66 Also, the prosecution twice
requested "shuffles" when there were a predominant number of African-
Americans in the front of the panel.167 At a hearing held by the trial court
after Batson was decided, Miller-El introduced the historical evidence of
racial discrimination in jury selection and use of challenges practiced by
the District Attorney's office, including the use of jury shuffles, along
with substantial other evidence supporting a prima facie case of
discrimination.' 68 But despite that showing, the trial court ruled against
Miller-El, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court,
and subsequently the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld
the federal district court's denial of a Certificate of Appealability. Then,
in an eight-to-one decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit,
holding that the lower court had used an overly stringent standard for the
granting of a Certificate of Appealability.169
The Supreme Court, however, would have to intervene again. On
remand, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's
163. 537 U.S. 322, 344 (2003).
164. Id. A circular used by the District Attorney's office directed prosecutors to strike
"Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member of any minority race on a jury." Id.
165. Id. at 333, 334. The "jury shuffle" has long been used in Texas to circumvent the
non-discriminatory intent of Batson. See, e.g., Michael M. Gallagher, Abolishing the
Texas Jury Shuffle, 35 ST. MARY'S L.J. 303, 308 (2004) ("[P]arties facing a Batson
challenge can easily defeat a Batson challenge. Removing the jury shuffle.... will ensure
greater fairness and justice for Texas litigants.").
166. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 331.
167. Id. at 333-34.
168. Id. at 334-35.
169. Id. at 341 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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denial of the writ. 7 ' Once again the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
After reviewing not only the prosecutors' actions in the case itself but
also the historical record of racial discrimination practiced by the Harris
County District Attorney's office in capital cases, the Court reversed,
holding that Miller-El was entitled to prevail on his habeas corpus
claim.' 7' As Justice Breyer noted in his concurring opinion: "despite the
strength of his claim, Miller-El's challenge has resulted in 17 years of
largely unsuccessful and protracted litigation ... including 23 judges, of
whom 6 found the Batson standard violated and 16 the contrary."' 172
For the very reason that Batson violations are easier to hide, they are,
in a sense, more pernicious than other, more blatant, types of
misconduct. As Chief Judge Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals
noted in People v. Brown, because of the way peremptory challenges
work, "[t]he opportunity for mischief abounds."'7 3 Of course, the
potential for mischief is a much greater concern in capital cases where
life is at stake. 174
V. PROSECUTOR USE OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND STATEMENTS IN CAPITAL
CASES
Unjust capital convictions may result from perjury, the use of false
testimony, the use of false evidence, the use of illegally obtained
evidence, the use of false statements in closing arguments, and the non-
disclosure of use of inadmissible evidence.' 75 The Supreme Court has
recognized the problem, noting that "deliberate deception of a court and
170. Miller-El v. Dretke, 361 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2004). The court relied in large part
upon Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion. Id.
171. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
172. Id. at 267 (Breyer, J., concurring).
173. Brown, 769 N.E.2d at 73.
174. See the following death penalty cases finding Batson violations: Holloway v.
Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 710-11 (3d Cir. 2004); Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1307 (1 1th Cir.
2003); Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 273 (3d Cir. 2001); Hardcastle v. Horn, 521 F.
Supp. 2d 388, 423 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Lark v. Beard, 495 F. Supp. 2d 488, 503 (E.D. Pa.
2007); Yancey v. State, 813 So. 2d 1, 2 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001); People v. Silva, 21 P.3d
769, 798 (Cal. 2001); State v. Coleman, 970 So. 2d 511, 516-17 (La. 2007); State v.
Harris, 820 So. 2d 471, 477 (La. 2002); Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 939 (Miss.
2007); State v. McFadden, 216 S.W.3d 673, 674 (Mo. 2007); State v. McFadden, 191
S.W.3d 648, 650 (Mo. 2006). See also Mahaffey v. Page, 162 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir.
1998) (finding Batson violation and remanding).
175. False evidence may also be inaccurate expert testimony based upon "junk
science." See, e.g., Craig Cooley, Forensic Science and Capital Punishment Reform: An
"Intellectually Honest" Assessment, 17 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 299 359 n.304
(2007) (discussing use of ridiculous claims made by experts regarding hair analysis and
bullet-lead analysis).
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jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with'rudimentary demands of justice."' ' 176 Similarly, several ethical rules
prohibit attorneys from using false evidence.177
The duties of prosecutors include the responsibility "'to see that
nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the jury."",178 Recent
additions to the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards
discuss the special responsibilities that prosecutors have regarding such
evidence. 179
This section addresses the prosecutorial use of false evidence in
capital cases. First, this section discusses Supreme Court decisions on the
issue, and then we discuss specific instances of the use of false evidence
in capital cases.
A. Supreme Court Case Law on the Use of False Evidence and Illegally
Obtained Evidence
The Supreme Court has long been concerned about the use of false
evidence. In 1957 in Alcorta v. Texas,' 80 the Supreme Court reversed a
176. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) (quoting Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935). See also Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). Also, in 1935,
the Court noted the importance of the prosecutor's role in a criminal case, stating that the
prosecution's "interest ... in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win case, but that
justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (holding that a
prosecutor has a duty to refrain from using improper methods to obtain a wrongful
conviction).
177. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (stating that lawyers
cannot assist witnesses in testifying falsely); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.4(b); ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, § 3-5.6(a) (3d
ed. 1993); ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, § 4-7.5(a).
178. Adams v. State, 30 So. 2d 593, 596 (Miss. 1947) (quoting 42 AM. JUR. § 20, at
255) (reversing conviction of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor). In Adams, the
court noted "'it is the duty of the prosecuting attorney, who represents all the people and
has no responsibility except fairly to discharge his duty, to hold himself under proper
restraint and avoid violent partisanship, partiality, and misconduct which may tend to
deprive the defendant of the fair trial to which he is entitled." Id.
179. The standards include statements on the use of undercover agents, confidential
informants, and illegally obtained evidence. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS §§
2.3, 2.4 & 3.5 (1993). Section 3.5 on illegally obtained evidence states: "The prosecutor
should take appropriate steps to limit the taint, if any, from the illegally obtained
evidence and determine if the evidence may still be lawfully used." Id. at §3.5(b). The
ABA House of Delegates passed the Standards on Prosecutorial Investigations in
February 2008. See Criminal Justice Section Standards, American Bar Association
Website, http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
180. 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
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murder conviction based on false testimony. 8 The Alcorta Court
focused on the false impression left with the jury after false testimony
was entered and considered the manner in which the prosecution elicited
the perjury.1 82
Two governing prosecutorial misconduct cases are Giglio v. United
States, 83 and Napue v. United States. 84 In Giglio, at trial the defense
attorney asked the cooperating witness if any plea agreements were
offered for his testimony, and the witness denied the existence of any
cooperation agreements.' 85 The prosecution re-affirmed to the jury that
no promises were made, at which point defense counsel made a motion
for a mistrial based on the failure of the prosecution to alert the defense
to the cooperating witness' status. 186 The Supreme Court reversed the
state court conviction, finding that due process was violated by the use of
the testimony. 187 The Court held that it was necessary to have a new trial
regardless of whether the use of such testimony was by "negligence or
design."' 188
In Napue, the Supreme Court remanded for a new murder trial
because the conviction had been obtained through the introduction of
false testimony without correction by the prosecution. 89 Napue involved
a cooperation agreement that was discovered by the defendant's research
and raised in his appeal coram nobis even though the cooperating
witness had initially denied the existence of such an agreement. 90 The
Napue Court reasoned that "[t]he principle that a State may not
knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a
tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of ordered liberty, does not
cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the
credibility of the witness."' 9' The Court continued, "The jury's estimate
of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be
determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as
181. In Alcorta, the jury rejected the heat of passion justification defense after the
eyewitness to the crime denied any sexual relations with defendant's wife only to later
admit at the habeas corpus hearing that they had sex five or six times. See id at 30-31.
182. Id. at 31.
183. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. The petitioner in Giglio had been convicted of passing
forged money orders. Id. at 150.
184. 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Napue had been convicted of murder. Id. at 266.
185. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 151.
186. Id. at 152.
187. Id. at 154-55.
188. Id. at 154.
189. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 267-72.
190. Id. at 267.
191. Id. at 269.
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the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's
life or liberty may depend."'' 92
False evidence that ultimately leads to a state conviction is only
reversed on appeal if the defendant establishes that there was a due
process violation. 93 A due process violation occurs when a prosecutor
actively solicits false testimony or allows false testimony to go
uncorrected. 194 The overarching question regarding false testimony is
whether "there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could
have affected the judgment of the jury.' '1 95
In the context of capital cases, intentional use of false evidence to
obtain a conviction and death sentence becomes much more egregious
because a life is at stake. The use of this type of evidence, in any of its
myriad forms, raises two main issues. The first is determining the role of
the prosecutor in the illegality and the second is whether that evidence
had enough of an adverse effect on the defendant's trial. 96
B. Capital and Murder Cases Involving the Use of False Evidence
There are a range of capital cases where prosecutors used false
evidence. An unethical prosecutor may present or use false evidence in
different ways. For example, first, in some capital cases, prosecutors
have presented false physical evidence and made references to the false
physical evidence during trial.197 Second, some prosecutors have used
192. Id. In Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974), the prosecutor made
prejudicial comments in his closing to the jury. The trial court gave curative instructions
to the jury, and comments were not deemed to be a due process violation. No violation
occurred due to the trial court eliminating any jury reliance on the prosecutor's
comments. Id. at 641-42.
193. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88-89.
194. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680; Napue, 360 U.S. at 269.
195. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103.
196. Id. at 103-04.
197. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 820-23 (1989) (finding in
capital case that prosecutor's continual references to a tract and prayer card found on
victim which prosecutor knew to be false was a violation of due process); Miller v. Pate,
386 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1967) (holding that the prosecutor's continual mention of the "blood"
linking the shorts to the victim, when in fact the "blood" was paint, was not harmless in
capital case); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 801, 810 (1972) (reversing capital case on
other grounds where a prosecutor got a different shotgun admitted than was found on
defendant). See also People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673, 679 (Cal. 1998); Gershowitz, supra
note 160, at 1073 (discussing that Hill's conviction was reversed partly because the
prosecutor "mischaracterized evidence, referred to facts not in evidence, and misstated
the law").
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prosecution witnesses who have given false testimony. 198 A third area of
prosecutor misuse of evidence is where a prosecutor makes prejudicial
comments to the jury.199 A fourth way that a prosecutor may misuse
evidence in capital cases is by using false convictions or bad acts in
support of aggravating factors.200 A fifth way that a capital prosecutor
may misuse evidence is by using false confessions or statements by
capital defendants.2°'
198. See, e.g., Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland, supra note 29, at 553 ("There
are many instances . . . of a prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence showing that the
testimony of the prosecutor's scientific expert was either false or misleading."); Bennett
L. Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence by Prosecutors, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
17, 21-28 (2003); Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192, 1195-97 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding no
prejudice to defendant when prosecutor did not exploit or use the complainant's recanting
of testifying to the grand jury); Toryanski, supra note 15, at 47-48 (discussing allegations
of use of false testimony in California case). In Nash v. Illinois, 389 U.S. 906, 906-07
(1967), the defendant argued that the prosecutor knowingly allowed a cooperating
witness to testify falsely that there was no cooperation agreement. In subsequent
proceedings, the petitioner called the prosecutor and the cooperating witness to the stand
where both admitted there was a cooperation agreement. Id. The petition for writ of
certiorari was denied, but in a dissenting opinion to the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari, Justice Fortas, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Douglas, reasoned that
the jury's minds were poisoned by the initial denial of the cooperation agreement. Id. See
also Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation With Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth
Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 917 (1999) (discussing study of
relationship between prosecutors and cooperating witnesses); MICHAEL L. RADELET,
HUGO ADAM BEDAU, & CONSTANCE E. PUTNAM, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE, 288, 290, 345,
347 (1992) (discussing cases of exonerated death row inmates Clarence Gilmore Boggie,
Joseph Green Brown, Terry Seaton, and Charles Smith, all who had claims that
prosecutors used perjured testimony).
199. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341, 344 (1985). A related area
of prosecutor misconduct occurs where prosecutors use a defendant's sexual orientation
in the state's strategy for seeking a conviction and death sentence. See Shortnacy, supra
note 23, at 317-18, 350-54 (arguing that the federal standard of review of state cases for
prosecutor misconduct in capital cases does not protect homosexual criminal defendants);
Ruthann Robson, Lesbianism and the Death Penalty, A "Hard Core" Case, 32 WOMEN'S
STUD. QUARTERLY 181 (2004).
200. See, e.g., Evans v. Virginia, 471 U.S. 1025, 1026-28 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari) (noting prosecutor used two false
convictions to present to the sentencing jury on the issue of future dangerousness, and the
jury considered the evidence important enough to give the defendant the death penalty).
201. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S. 1067 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting from
denial of petition for writ of certiorari). In Jacobs, a false confession was used by the
prosecution as almost the entire basis for the defendant's guilt resulting in a conviction
and the death penalty. Id. The prosecution later repudiated that same confession
commenting on its utter unreliability and the prosecution admitted having knowledge that
there was a different shooter. Id. But that same prosecutor's office later recanted on the
defendant's appeal and reaffirmed the strength and reliability of the conviction. Id.
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Caldwell v. Mississippi202 is one example of a capital case involving
a prosecutor making prejudicial comments to the jury. In that case, the
Supreme Court vacated a death sentence after the prosecutor made
comments to the jurors that minimized the importance of their role in
determining whether the death penalty should apply.20 3 The Court
considered the requirement of heightened reliability in Eighth
Amendment death penalty cases.204 At trial during closing arguments, the
prosecutor discussed the automatic appeal rights of the defendant,
stressing that the jury is not completely responsible for a death sentence
because the courts review such decisions. 20 5
The Supreme Court found that the remarks by that prosecutor were
inaccurate and misleading. 20 6 Most problematic, the jury had been led to
believe that the responsibility for the death sentence fell on other people
not sitting on the trial jury.20 7 Thus, because "the State sought to
minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the
appropriateness of death," the Court reversed the death sentence. 20 8
Similarly, in a 2008 case from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, the court considered a prosecutor's repeated
misstatements implying that a capital defendant could be released if the
jury sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole.20 9 The court
202. Cadwell, 472 U.S. at 324-25. In another capital case in 2005, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that a prosecutor's comments violated a
defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Ben-Yisrayl v. Davis,
431 F.3d 1043, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 2005). In that case, the prosecutor had stated to the jury,
"Let the Defendant tell you why somebody would freely and voluntarily confess." Id. at
1049. The court found that the prosecutor asked the jurors to make an adverse inference
from the defendant's failure to testify, violating the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1051-53.
203. Cadwell, 472 U.S. at 324-25.
204. Id. at 341.
205. Id at 325. The prosecutor stated:
Ladies and gentlemen, I intend to be brief. I'm in complete disagreement with
the approach the defense has taken. I don't think it's fair. I think it's unfair. I
think the lawyers know better. Now, they would have you believe that you're
going to kill this man and they know - - they know that your decision is not the
final decision. My God, how unfair can you be? Your job is reviewable. They
know it.
Id.
206. Id. at 322.
207. Id. at 328-29.
208. Cadwell, 472 U.S. at 341. The Court also considered the trial court's instructions
to the jury that were not curative but agreed with the misstatement of law by the
prosecutor, stressing that the case was reviewable. Id at 322-25. These remarks by the
trial court judge only further created the incorrect impression that the jury had less actual
responsibility than they did. Id. at 325.
209. Sechrest v. Ignacio, 54 F.3d 789, 808 (9th Cir. 2008). Among the statements, the
prosecutor referenced the sentence of life without parole and stated: '"You don't die in
2009] VIGILANTE JUSTICE 1361
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
found that the prosecutor's false, inflammatory statements violated the
capital defendant's right to fair trial.21° In another recent case, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found a due process
violation when the prosecutor asserted his belief in the death penalty and
claimed that executing the defendant was necessary to further the war on
drugs.211
In Jenkins v. Artuz,212 a 2002 non-capital murder case, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a state
prosecutor's conduct violated a defendant's due process rights.213
Although at trial the prosecutor was supposed to bring up a cooperation
plea agreement on direct examination of that witness, she did not bring it
up, and upon hearing the witness deny the existence of any agreement,
she followed up with re-direct that suggested there was no agreement.214
prison of old age. People get out. Now, are you prepared to risk the life of some other
person or child by giving him the opportunity to get out?' Id. at 809. The prosecutor also
"inflamed the passions of the jury by calling the defense a 'fraud,' and telling the jury
that if they '[fell] for that fraud,' they would be 'risk[ing] the life of some other person or
child."' Id. at 811.
210. Id. at 809. See also Coleman v. Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding due process violation where prosecutor asked jurors to impose capital
punishment to protect society along with misleading jury instruction on parole).
211. Weaver v. Bowersox, 438 F.3d 832, 840-41 (8th Cir. 2006). See also Cargle v.
Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1218 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding due process violation where
prosecutor asserted to the jury that his office only prosecuted guilty people); Romine v.
Head 253 F.3d 1349, 1368-71 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding due process violation where
prosecutor referred to scripture from Bible requiring the death penalty for individuals
who murder their parents); Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635, 648-49 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding
due process violation where prosecutor told jurors that failure to impose the death penalty
would be like putting a gun in the hand of the defendant). Cf Billings v. Polk, 441 F.3d
238, 250-51 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that there was no due process violation where
prosecutor invoked the Bible to justify the state's death penalty statute); Ries v.
Quarterman, 522 F.3d 517, 529-30 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that due process was not
violated where prosecutor asserted that the capital defendant deserved to die).
212. 294 F.3d. 284, 287-90, 293-97 (2d Cir. 2002).
213. Id. at 286. Even though the court was applying a deferential habeas standard of
review to a state court's decision upholding the conviction, the federal court found that
the state violated due process by using false testimony against the defendant. Id.
214. Id. at 293-94. The Jenkins court also considered the prosecutor's closing
argument in which she stressed that there was no agreement and made the suggestion that
her witness had no motive to lie. Id. at 294-95. The court, however, did not reach a
conclusion on whether the summation independently violated the defendant's due process
rights. Id. Professor Gershman has noted, "One of the most insidious prosecutorial
schemes to subvert Brady is the orchestration of a plan whereby a key prosecution
witness, who ordinarily would have a motive to lie by virtue of having made a deal with
the government, testifies that no deal was made." Gershman, Litigating Brady v.
Maryland, supra note 29, at 538. See Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 979-86 (9th Cir.
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The overarching prosecutorial misconduct due process inquiry was
whether the continued knowing use of the false testimony could
reasonably have affected the trial's outcome.21 5 The court concluded that
there was a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony affected the
jury's verdict, 216 and in finding the constitutional violation, the court
noted "the heightened opportunity for prejudice where the prosecutor, by
action or inaction, is complicit in the untruthful testimony., 21 7 The court
also quoted the New York Code of Professional responsibility regarding
the prosecutor's duty to seek justice and, "[i]n particular, 'a prosecutor
should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely because he or
she believes it will damage the prosecutor's case or aid the accused.' 2 8
Finally, one particularly egregious recent example of a capital
prosecutor using false testimony is from Pima County in Arizona. By the
early 1990s, Kenneth Peasley had conducted approximately sixty death
penalty trials.219 He won national awards and twice won the Arizona
prosecutor-of-the-year award while being "personally responsible for a
tenth of the prisoners on Arizona's death row."220 Then he took a triple-
murder to trial with less than sterling evidence, and in that case he and
his detective used false testimony of a jailhouse informant to obtain
convictions and death sentences for all three defendants. 221 His use of the
false testimony did not come to light until five years after the trial when
an attorney for one of the co-defendants listened to the interrogation
tapes of the informant and the informant referred to a previous
interrogation session.222 After hearing the informant state at trial that the
2005) (en banc) (vacating conviction in murder case where prosecutor had asserted in
open court that there was no deal with a witness when in fact there was a deal).
215. Jenkins, 294 F.3d. at 293. In establishing the factors necessary to set aside a
conviction that is based on potential prosecutorial misconduct, the Jenkins court noted
that a prosecutor's words alone may be enough for a due process violation. Id. at 294-95.
"Standing alone, a prosecutor's comments upon summation can 'so infect [a] trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process."' Id. at 294
(quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at
643) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
216. Id. at 295-96. The court focused on how the jury was affected by the defense
counsel's examination of the state's cooperating witness, by the subsequent cross-
examination, and by the closing remarks of the prosecutor. Id at 293-95. The court
stressed that the reviewing courts should examine the weight of all of the evidence,
including whether or not without the false testimony and reinforcing remarks by the
State, the jury might not have convicted. Id. at 293
217. Id. at 295 (citations omitted).
218. Id. at 296 n.2 (quoting N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-13 (1981)).
219. See In re Peasley, 90 P.3d 764, 767 (Ariz. 2004).
220. Jeffrey Toobin, Killer Instincts, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2005, at 54.
221. Peasley, 90 P.3d. at 766.
222. Id. at 766-69.
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first time he ever talked to the detective was at the recorded
interrogation, the assigned defense counsel knew that there was more to
the story and got his client acquitted.223
Later, the same assigned counsel filed a bar complaint against
Kenneth Peasley, and that complaint ultimately resulted in Peasley's
224disbarment in 2004. The Supreme Court of Arizona, en banc, referred
to the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions in deciding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction.225
Most capital prosecutors realize that these tactics are unethical and a
violation of the law, and several ethical provisions cover the use of false
evidence. 226 But as the Mille-El and Peasley examples illustrate, it can
take more than a decade for instances of misconduct to be discovered and
addressed. Thus, ethical lawyers are still faced with the problem of what
should be done to prevent wrongful capital convictions and to deter
unethical prosecutors from seeking vigilante justice by misusing
evidence.227
VI. VARIOUS PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT IN
CAPITAL CASES
Prosecutors, other lawyers, and scholars have considered various
ways to prevent and deter prosecutor misconduct in criminal cases. The
proposals may be divided in three general categories of approaches to
limit instances of prosecutor misconduct in capital cases: (1) institutional
and systemic methods, besides penalizing individual prosecutors, to deter
223. Id. at 768-69.
224. See id. at 764; see also Toobin, supra note 220, at 59.
225. Peasley, 90 P.3d at 769. The court referred, specifically, to Standard 6.11, which
states: "Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to deceive the
court, makes a false statement, submits a false document, or improperly withholds
material information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes
a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding."
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 6.1 (1992).
226. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (1983) (stating that
lawyers cannot assist witnesses in testifying falsely); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 3.4(b); STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-
5.6(a) (1993); STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-
7.5(a) (1993).
227. See also White, supra note 53, at 1266-86; Stephen Saltzburg, Symposium:
Perjury and False Testimony: Should the Difference Matter so Much?, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1537 (2000); Monroe Freedman, Essay: Professional Discipline of Professional
Prosecutors: A Response to Professor Zacharias, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 121 (2001); Holly
Piehler Rockwell, Prejudicial Effect of Statement by Prosecutor that Verdict,
Recommendation of Punishment, or Other Finding by Jury is Subject to Review or
Correction by Other Authorities, 10 A.L.R. 700 (1993); Toobin, supra note 220, at 58.
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misconduct generally; (2) penalties by prosecutor offices, bar
organizations, and/or courts for individual misbehaving prosecutors; and
(3) court remedies given to defendants in cases where there was
prosecutor misconduct. The following subsections discuss various
alternative solutions that prosecutor offices, bar organizations, and courts
might consider to address prosecutor misconduct in capital cases. In the
Conclusion, this Article lists five suggestions that should have priority
for first steps toward preventing future misconduct in capital cases.
A. Institutional and Systemic Methods of Preventing Violations
The best way to address the problem of prosecutor misconduct in
capital cases is to prevent the violation from occurring at all. Ethical
prosecutors, perhaps, are in the best position to prevent egregious
misconduct by other attorneys.228 Thus, prosecutor offices can evaluate
methods of training and supervising lawyers, and when a violation
occurs in a specific office, that office should reassess its training.
The ABA Standards note the importance of prosecutor office training
"for new personnel and for continuing education of the staff., 2 29 One
writer has noted that some well-intentioned prosecutors may still have a
bias toward guilt, so some training strategies, such as the practice of
having prosecutors generate defense arguments and having prosecutors
become involved in Innocence Projects, may help prosecutors maintain a
balanced sense of justice.230
Prosecutor misconduct resulting from the use of false evidence and
misuse of publicity may be addressed by further training. For example,
prosecutor offices should examine how they train new prosecutors and
whether they retrain veteran prosecutors on the subject of dealing with
high profile cases. In the heat of a trial, it is easy for both defense
attorneys and prosecutors to forget the ill effects of the misuse of
publicity, so every reminder of ethical obligations is useful.
Excellent training is essential for addressing the more complex legal
areas of Brady and Batson violations. Capital prosecutors must be trained
to request all materials from agencies involved in investigating the case
because a Brady violation occurs even if the information is in the hands
228. "Locally, chief prosecutors can and should play a prominent role in reducing the
harm caused by prosecutorial misconduct, and they can do so by implementing and
monitoring clearer guidelines within their offices and disciplining those prosecutors who
do not live up to those obligations." Joy, supra note 5, at 428.
229. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § 3-2.6
(1993).
230. See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1613-26 (2006).
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of police officials and the prosecutor never sees it.23' Because of the
specialized training received by prosecutors, they can play an important
role in helping investigative agencies to follow the dictates of Brady.
Further, another method to ensure compliance with Brady would be
for each office to have a written policy requiring the full discovery
required by law and addressing what internal disciplinary penalties will
be. A jurisdiction should consider having such policies and having them
reviewed by the Attorney General's office. A written policy would
emphasize the importance of disclosing exculpatory evidence as an
important part of the role of the prosecutor beyond the goals to obtain
convictions.232
In addition to actions by individual prosecutor offices, courts and
legislatures similarly may help prevent Brady violations in capital cases
by adopting a rule or statute that, in addition to existing ethical rules,
offers guidance to prosecutors in evaluating whether evidence is
exculpatory. 233 Recently, after two years of research and study, the
231. See Whitley, 514 U.S. at 437-38.
232. Certainly, better training and supervision in prosecutor offices are necessary to
teach prosecutors to disclose evidence, but the problem may be deeper. Some
commentators have noted that one problem with the prosecution system in America is
that, unlike in Great Britain, America's adversary system inherently makes prosecutors
and defense attorneys have a narrow view of the system, seeing the only goal to be
winning. In Great Britain, cases are prosecuted by barristers who are not professional
full-time prosecutors. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, supra note 37, at 455-57. Thus,
they view themselves as professional attorneys, whose goal is to seek justice.
Most commentators do not propose dismantling our American adversary system
of justice, but we can learn from other countries. One commentator has suggested we
make more use of a system where private attorneys help out in prosecutor offices as part
of special programs. "Such programs are laudable for several reasons. They allow private
attorneys to engage in public service, they enhance the public interest by helping to more
expeditiously process criminal cases, and they introduce into prosecution attorneys who
do not have a vested interest in winning convictions." Id. at 457. Adding this new
structure to prosecutors' offices may help to undermine the system of overzealous
prosecutions more effectively than merely better training and supervision.
Also, a former judge has suggested that "[p]rosecutors who try capital cases
should be required to prepare and argue their own appeals." White, supra note 53, at
1297. Forcing the prosecutors to defend their own unprofessional or unconstitutional
conduct before concerned appellate judges would certainly be a deterrent to prosecutorial
misconduct at trial. One drawback to this proposal is that the use of a different prosecutor
on an appeal provides another check on the trial prosecutors because the ethical appellate
prosecutor might be more likely to discover and reveal the error of the undisclosed Brady
material.
233. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also helps reinforce the responsibility
of prosecutors regarding evidence of innocence. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8 (1983). Section 3.8(d) provides:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: . . . make timely disclosure to the
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to
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Illinois panel appointed by the governor issued the Report of the
Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment,234 recommending
eighty-five reforms to the criminal justice system to address concerns
about executing innocent persons.235  One of the panel's
recommendations was that the state supreme court should adopt a rule
defining "exculpatory evidence. 236 The definition would not change the
responsibilities imposed by Brady, but it would "remind counsel of the
basic requirements for disclosure of exculpatory evidence by way of
example., 237 The unanimous panel recommended language for the
proposal, based upon the Local Criminal Rules for the Federal District
Court in Massachusetts.2 38 The proposed Illinois language should be
considered by death penalty jurisdictions.239  A further step,
recommended by some commentators, is for state supreme courts or
legislatures to broaden discovery requirements to require prosecutors to
have open-file discovery in all capital cases (or in all criminal cases).24°
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with
sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged
mitigating information known to the prosecutor except when the prosecutor is
relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.
Id.
234. Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, State of Illinois,
April 15, 2002, available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/index.html [hereinafter
Report of the Governor's Commission].
235. Id.
236. Id. at 120.
237. Id. at 120.
238. See D. Mass R. 116.2, available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/genera/pdf/-
combined0 I.pdf.
239. The Commission recommended the following definition of "exculpatory
evidence:"
Exculpatory information includes, but may not be limited to, all information
that is material and favorable to the defendant because it tends to:
a.Cast doubt on defendant's guilt as to any essential element in any
count in the indictment or information;
b.Cast doubt on the admissibility of evidence that the state anticipates
offering in its case-in-chief that might be subject to a motion to
suppress or exclude;
c.Cast doubt on the credibility or accuracy of any evidence that the
state anticipates offering in its case-in-chief, or
d.Diminish the degree of the defendant's culpability or mitigate the
defendant's potential sentence.
Report of the Governor's Commission, supra note 234, at 119.
240. Some commentators have suggested that states go a step further and that "[o]pen-
file discovery should be the norm in death penalty cases" and that legislatures should
make it mandatory. Minsker, supra note 20, at 403. See also Burke, Revisiting
Prosecutorial Disclosure, supra note 42, at 481; Joy, supra note 5, at 425.
2009] 1367
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
Another unanimous proposal made by the Illinois Commission on
Capital Punishment is that state law should require "that any discussions
with a witness or the representative of a witness concerning benefits,
potential benefits or detriments conferred on a witness by any prosecutor,
police official, corrections official or anyone else, should be reduced to
writing, and should be disclosed to the defense in advance of trial."24'
Noting a number of death penalty cases where convictions have been
reversed because of questions about whether defense counsel had been
fully informed of deals with witnesses, the panel concluded that such a
rule would help address that problem.242
A final suggestion to address Brady violations is that prosecutors
should be trained to overcome biases that may develop in prosecuting a
capital case and to recognize exculpatory evidence. A growing area of
cognitive research reveals that human decision-makers such as
prosecutors-as well as judges and jurors-function with cognitive
biases, "rendering them neither perfectly rational information processors,
nor wholly random or irrational decision makers., 243 For example,
241. Report of the Governor's Commission, supra note 234, at 120.
242. Id. at 120-21. Similarly, courts make Brady a more effective protection against
executing innocent defendants when they clarify that Brady obligations continue even
after a capital trial ends. See, e.g., High v. Head, 209 F.3d 1257, 1265 n.8 (11th Cir.
2000) (noting that the state's duty to disclose exculpatory material is ongoing); Smith v.
Roberts, 115 F.3d 818, 820 (10th Cir. 1997) ("We also agree, and the State concedes, that
the duty to disclose is ongoing and extends to all stages of the judicial process."); Thomas
v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1992) ("We do not refer to the state's past
duty to turn over exculpatory evidence at trial, but to its present duty to turn over
exculpatory evidence relevant to the instant habeas corpus proceeding."); State v.
Bennett, 81 P.3d 1, 9 (Nev. 2003) (stating that the state's affirmative duty to disclose
exculpatory material "exists regardless of whether the State uncovers the evidence before
trial, during trial, or after the defendant has been convicted"). See also Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n. 25 (1976)
(noting in a Section 1983 action that "after a conviction the prosecutor also is bound by
the ethics of his office to inform the appropriate authority of after-acquired or other
information that casts doubt upon the correctness of the conviction").
243. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making, supra note 230, at 1591. Four
aspects of cognitive bias are: "confirmation bias, selective information processing, belief
perseverance, and the avoidance of cognitive dissonance." Id. at 1593. Prof Burke
explained these terms:
Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek to confirm, rather than disconfirm,
any hypothesis under study. Selective information processing causes people to
overvalue information that is consistent with their preexisting theories and to
undervalue information that challenges those theories. Belief perseverance
refers to the human tendency to continue to adhere to a theory, even after the
evidence underlying the theory is disproved. Finally, the desire to avoid
cognitive dissonance can cause people to adjust their beliefs to maintain
existing self-perceptions.
Id. at 1593-94.
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because of confirmation bias, a person tends to seek to confirm a theory,
thus an individual prosecutor may be biased toward evidence confirming
guilt and may overlook exculpatory evidence. 244 There are various ways
of addressing these cognitive bias problems, including the suggestion
that a "method of improving prosecutorial decision making is to train
prosecutors and future prosecutors about the sources of cognitive bias
and the potential effects of cognitive bias upon rational decision
making." 245 Other suggestions include encouraging prosecutors to
practice switching sides to see the arguments from the defense
perspective, 246 involving unbiased decision makers in the choices made
by prosecutors,247  and encouraging prosecutorial involvement in
innocence projects and groups concerned with providing quality criminal
defense services.248
Batson violations also may be addressed by further training within
prosecutor offices. Similarly, additional training about use of publicity
and evidence may help prevent other types of violations. Certainly,
many, if not all, prosecutor offices already provide effective training in
these areas. But because violations still occur in capital cases, offices
should reassess their training, and offices where violations have occurred
should do an extensive evaluation of their training methods. In addition
to training sessions for new attorneys, experienced attorneys should also
have to attend training sessions in these areas.
Finally, one way each prosecutor office may provide guidance to its
lawyers is to have written guidelines, and these guidelines should
generally be available to the public. Unfortunately, "a relatively small
number of the more than 23000 prosecutors' offices that try felony cases
in state court of general jurisdictions have manuals or written standards,
or, if they do, those manuals or standards are not available to the
public. '249 Both the American Bar Association Prosecution Function
Standards and the National District Attorneys Association recommend
that each office have written policies and procedures that guide
prosecutorial discretion and that these policies generally be available to
the public.50
244. See id.
245. Id. at 1616. For other suggestions, see generally id.
246. Id. at 1618-20.
247. Id. at 1621-24.
248. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making, supra note 230, at 1624-26.
249. Joy, supra note 5, at 422.
250. See id.; STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-2.5(b) (1993); NATIONAL
PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 10.3, at 39-40 (Nat'l Dist. Att'y Ass'n 1991).
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B. Methods That Address Individual Unethical Prosecutors Who Commit
Egregious Misconduct
Unethical prosecutors are rarely sanctioned for prosecutorial
misconduct.2 51 Of course, each case must be considered individually, and
every case does not deserve sanctions. In some instances, attorney errors
may occur through inadvertence or negligence, and those instances may
be addressed in a different manner than instances of intentional
misconduct. But in individual cases involving egregious prosecutor
misconduct, the problem should be addressed by: (1) bar and ethics
organizations; (2) courts; and (3) prosecutor offices.
1. Bar and Ethics Organizations
Bar organizations must be more active in policing prosecutorial
misconduct. Sanctions ranging from fines to disbarment, in the most
serious cases, should be used. One former judge has written about the
importance of enforcing ethical rules against attorneys in capital cases.
"If the police or the prosecutor fabricates evidence, improves testimony,
fails to disclose the required information, or makes inappropriate
arguments to the jury, they should be publicly sanctioned. The possible
sanctions should include suspension from the duties of their public
offices. 252 The former judge explained, "Only if the actors know that
real consequences will follow their acts will they attempt to correct
them. 25
3
Commentators, however, have noted that "in practice, prosecutors
rarely have been disciplined for their violations. 254 If the state bar ethics
251. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text; Angela J. Davis, The American
Prosecutor: Power, Discretion, and Misconduct, 23 CRIM. JUSTICE 24, 37 (noting study
that found in most cases of misconduct "prosecutors suffered no consequences and were
not held accountable or even reprimanded for their behavior"); Natasha Minsker, supra
note 20, at 373-74 (noting that research of California death penalty cases and of six
named prosecutors in cases reversed for prosecutorial misconduct, "[f]ive [of which
have] 'no public record of discipline,' and one is a sitting judge"). See also Adam
Liptak, Prosecutor Becomes Prosecuted, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2007, at 4. For example, a
Chicago Tribune article found that not one prosecutor was convicted of a crime or
disbarred in 381 murder cases where the conviction was reversed due to prosecutor
misconduct. Id. Similarly, prosecutor penalties are rare in capital cases where defendants
are exonerated. Id.
252. White, supra note 53, at 1297.
253. Id.
254. Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV.
721, 769 (2001). See also Minsker, supra note 20, at 398 (noting that in California,
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boards are unable to deal with the specialized area of prosecutorial
misconduct in capital cases, other methods should be considered.255 One
suggestion for dealing with prosecutorial misconduct is to create a
specialized disciplinary organization that is only for prosecutors, like
judicial conduct organizations that currently exist.256 A state could pass a
statute that would create a committee to investigate, permit a hearing
examiner to oversee grievance proceedings, and permit disciplinary
sanctions such as removal, admonitions, and fines. 7 Such a committee
could also act as a repository for complaints.258
As for other prosecutor misconduct violations, disciplinary
proceedings should be considered for egregious violations of the ethical
rules regarding pretrial publicity. Professional responsibility remedies are
especially important in the area of pretrial publicity, even more than in
most other categories of prosecutor misconduct. Courts seem unlikely to
provide judicial remedies to defendants based on pretrial publicity
grounds because prejudice is difficult to show and the remedy of
dismissing an indictment is an extreme remedy.
"almost no prosecutors are even reported for misconduct in death penalty cases, even
when the conduct was intentional").
255. In an example of how a bar might even hinder investigation of prosecutor
misconduct, in one recent death penalty case a Virginia defense lawyer was advised by
the Virginia State Bar to remain quiet about his knowledge of prosecutor misconduct.
After he eventually revealed his information about prosecutors coaching a witness and
hiding it from a defense, the information about prosecutor misconduct resulted in a
commutation for the defendant. Adam Liptak, Lawyer Reveals Secret, Toppling Death
Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, at Al.
256. See Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38
S.W. L.J. 965 (1984); Gershman, The New Prosecutors, supra note 37, at 454. See also
BARRY SCHECK, ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 355 (2001) (suggesting the creation of "blue
ribbon disciplinary committees to deal exclusively with misconduct by criminal defense
attorneys and prosecutors"). "As a quasi-judicial officer functioning under special ethical
standards, the prosecutor, like the judge, is an appropriate subject for regulation and
enforcement of discipline." Gershman, The New Prosecutors, supra note 37, at 454.
257. See Catherine Greene Burnett, Prosecutor Ethics Symposium, 47 S. TEx. L. REV.
677, 681-83 (2006) (noting Professor Shelby A.D. Moore's argument that failing to
impose a criminal sanction for willful and intentional misconduct by prosecutors results
"in a system that will continue to be burdened by the damage caused by unethical
prosecutors: unjust convictions and sometimes, imposition of society's ultimate
punishment - the death penalty").
258. One commentator has suggested that a group should have the responsibility to
identify prosecutors who have committed serious misconduct to shame the prosecutors
and encourage courts to monitor the attorneys in the future. See Gershowitz, supra note
160, at 1059.
2009] 1371
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
2. Court Sanctions for Individual Prosecutors
As a possible remedy to deter egregious misconduct in capital cases,
one might consider lawsuits against individual prosecutors who
intentionally violate the law. 25 9 In civil suit cases, there are immunity
issues that may prevent such remedies.26 ° In Imbler v. Pachtman,26' the
Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot sue a prosecutor under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for withholding exculpatory evidence because prosecutors
have absolute immunity for advocacy activities.262 A § 1983 action
might, however, be a remedy for some non-Brady prosecutorial
misconduct because prosecutors only have qualified immunity for
investigative and administrative activities. 263
259. Criminal prosecution for egregious misconduct is an unlikely sanction because,
among other reasons, courts seem reluctant to allow such extreme remedies. In 1999 in
Illinois, prosecutors were charged with an alleged plot to frame a capital defendant for
murder. Pam Belluck, Officials Face Trial in Alleged Plot to Frame a Man for Murder,
N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 1999, at A19. At the time, the Chicago Tribune noted it could only
find six other examples nationally in which prosecutors faced criminal charges for
misconduct. Id. "Of those prosecutors, two were convicted of misdemeanors and fined
$500. Two were acquitted, and charges against the other two were dropped before trial."
Id. New York has a misdemeanor statute for official misconduct, a misdemeanor that
could arguably apply to prosecutor misconduct by its language. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 195.00 (McKinney 2006). Although the statute has not been applied to prosecutors thus
far, the New York Court of Appeals has stated that the Rules of Judicial Conduct may be
used as a basis for prosecution for violating official duties under the New York criminal
statutes. See People v. Garson, 848 N.E.2d 1264, 1265 (N.Y. 2006) (finding basis for
prosecuting a judge who was accused of accepting a bribe as violating his duty as a
public servant).
260. Some commentators have criticized the application of the immunity doctrine to
prosecutors responsible for misconduct. See Malia N. Brink, A Pendulum Swung Too
Far: Why the Supreme Court Must Place Limits on Prosecutorial Immunity, 4
CHARLESTON L. REV. 1 (2009); Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial
Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53, 125 (2005).
261. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
262. Id. at 430-31.
263. See Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (stating that a prosecutor may be sued for
actions during the investigative stage of a case); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997)
(finding no absolute immunity where prosecutor acted as a witness in signing a certificate
that charging documents were accurate). Additionally, a prosecutor might not receive
absolute immunity regarding advice given to police officers. See Walker v. City of New
York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that allegations that a prosecutor was
deliberately indifferent to police questions about exculpatory evidence and that the
prosecutor failed to train and supervise police provided a basis for municipal liability);
BENNETr L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 14-25 through 14-30 (2d ed.
1999). For further examples, prosecutors may not be immune from lawsuits if they use
threats to force a confession, if they engage in illegal searches, if they participate in
illegal wiretapping, or if they make false comments to the press. Id.; see, e.g., Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (holding that false statements made by prosecutors to
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Thus, for the most part, courts must look for other types of sanctions
for prosecutor misconduct in capital cases besides monetary damages. In
capital cases, where an individual prosecutor has intentionally withheld
exculpatory evidence, the court should deem that the prosecutor cannot
act as an agent of justice and remove that prosecutor from any further
involvement with the case. Further, in egregious capital cases, an
individual prosecutor should not be allowed to participate in any future
264death penalty cases.
One method for dealing with prosecutor misconduct is for courts to
hold capital prosecutors in contempt when they intentionally withhold
exculpatory evidence, misuse publicity, misuse peremptory challenges,
or use illegally obtained evidence. 265 "Contempt can be easily
administered, interferes only marginally with the criminal proceeding,
punishes the prosecutor rather than society, and can be adjusted
according to the severity of the misconduct. ' '266 Currently, though,
contempt is rarely used to punish prosecutors for courtroom
misbehavior.267
3. Prosecutor Office Sanctions for Individual Prosecutors
Because of a tendency by bars and by courts to be reluctant to
impose sanctions upon individual unethical prosecutors, much of the
responsibility for addressing misconduct problems ultimately falls on
individual prosecutor offices. When necessary, prosecutor offices may
impose sanctions that affect salaries and promotions in order to deter
prosecutorial misconduct.268 One commentator has argued, possibly
the press only received qualified immunity); McSurley v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (allowing damages where suing prosecutor for engaging in illegal search). The
Supreme Court may be ready to reevaluate issues about prosecutor immunity. In
Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, No. 08-1065, the Supreme Court recently granted a
petition for certiorari and heard arguments to review prosecutor immunity for actions
prior to trial, but the case was dismissed after the parties reached a settlement. Case Over
Iowa Prosecutor's Conduct is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/01/04/us/AP-US-Supreme-Court-
Prosecutors.html.
264. "A court has the power to remove or disqualify a prosecutor from office on
grounds of misconduct or conflict of interest." GERSHMAN, supra note 263, at 14-7.
265. Id. at 14-14. See Brostoff v. Berkman, 170 A.D.2d 364, 566 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1st
Dep't 1991).
266. GERSHMAN, SUpra note 263, at 14-14.
267. Id. at 14-14 through 14-15.
268. See, e.g., Brian Rogers, Prosecutors Disciplined in Jury Flap: Pay Docked,
Assignment Charged After Blacks Rejected for Panel, HOUSTON CHRON., March 27,
2000. Harris County (TX) District Attorney Pat Lykos docked the pay of two prosecutors
and removed them from trial work for removing all African-Americans from the jury in a
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because enforcement of regulations within a prosecutor's office is
discretionary, that such regulations are ineffective and prosecutors
cannot punish themselves. 269 An alternative would be for sanctions to
come from professionals outside an individual office.27 °
Another way that responsible prosecutor offices may deter future
misconduct is to ensure that vigilante prosecutors who commit
intentional misconduct in a capital case do not prosecute further capital
cases.271 Such a decision would prevent that prosecutor from committing
serious misconduct in the future and would send a strong message.
Of course, a more extreme remedy is for prosecutor offices to fire
attorneys responsible for egregious misconduct in capital cases. For
example, in a recent Kentucky case, one office forced a prosecutor to
resign because of allegations that in a capital case she had withheld
information from defense attorneys and had lied to a judge about a deal
that was made with an informant.272
murder trial of a black defendant. Id. Some commentators, however, said that such a
move by a supervising prosecutor was rare, with the president of the Harris County
Criminal Lawyers Association stating, "I can't think of a case under previous
administrations where prosecutors were disciplined for doing something that hurt or
could have hurt the rights of the accused." Id.
269. GERSHMAN, supra note 263, at 14-2 (noting that the Office of Professional
Responsibility of the U.S. Justice Department "absolves prosecutors of wrongdoing in
most of the cases, and discipline seems woefully inadequate"). See also Rogers, supra
note 268.
270. One suggestion is to use "a system of highly regarded professionals independent
of prosecutors' offices" that is "one of peer review by experienced criminal justice
professionals with the power to sanction prosecutors who engage in misconduct." Ellen
Yarashefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously,
8 U. D.C. L. REV. 275, 297-98 (2004). At least one author has proposed that a carrot, in
addition to a stick, might help. Professor Janet Hoeffel has suggested that prosecutors
might act more ethically if they were financially rewarded for convictions that make it
through the appeals process without a finding of error. Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutor
Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133,
1151-53 (2005). One concern, however, for such a remedy might be that it would also
provide an added incentive for misconduct through the appeals process.
271. See, e.g., Kelly Gier, Note, Prosecuting Injustice: Consequences of Misconduct,
33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191, 208 (2006).
272. Jason Riley, Prosecutor Steps Down After Allegations, COURIER JOURNAL
(LouiSVILLE, KY), June 12, 2009. Jefferson County Commonwealth's Attorney David
Stengel stated that he would have fired the attorney had she not resigned because "we
have substantiated a level of inattention and thoughtlessness ... that cannot be tolerated."
Id.
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C. Remedies for the Defendant in Cases Involving Misconduct
As commentators have noted, a reversal on appeal is "a significant
penalty for misconduct" because a reversal will require a retrial and may
affect a prosecutor's career, thus offering a deterrent effect to
prosecutors.273 For example, at least in certain circumstances, an
indictment may be dismissed or a conviction may be reversed where the
prosecutor has withheld exculpatory evidence.274
Yet, courts do not reverse convictions in many cases where
misconduct violations actually occurred.275 Defendants who show
misconduct by prosecutors still have a heavy burden in order to obtain a
reversal.2 76 In most cases involving withheld exculpatory evidence,
misuse of pretrial publicity, and the use of false evidence, the defendant
must also show prejudice to obtain a reversal. 277 In Batson cases, courts
are likely to accept a broad range of explanations from prosecutors.
Thus, "reversal for prosecutorial misconduct is relatively infrequent. 278
One remedy for this problem would be to remove the prejudice
requirement or at least alter it. Commentators have suggested that a
273. GERSHMAN, supra note 263, at 14-13.
274. See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1013, 1085-88 (9th Cir. 2008)
(upholding, in a non-capital case, a district court's decision to dismiss an indictment
because of flagrant prosecutor misconduct in withholding evidence). A court "'may
dismiss an indictment on the ground of outrageous government conduct if the conduct
amounts to a due process violation."' Id. at 1084 (quoting United States v. Barrera-
Moreno, 951 F.2d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 1991)). Additionally, "'[i]f the conduct does not
rise to the level of a due process violation, the court may nonetheless dismiss under its
supervisory powers."' Id.
275. See generally Michael D. Ciechini, Prosecutorial Misconduct at Trial: A New
Perspective Rooted in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 335
(2007). "Decades of court decisions have proved that judges will rarely grant a
defendant's request for mistrial no matter how blatant or harmful the prosecutor's
misconduct. . . . This use of judicial discretion consistently permits, and in fact
encourages, even the most flagrant forms of prosecutorial misconduct." Id. at 336.
276. See Minsker, supra note 20, at 397 (concluding from analysis of California capital
cases that "post-conviction review largely fails to address the problem of prosecutorial
misconduct in death penalty cases").
277. See id at 397 (noting that "the application of 'harmless error' analysis to
prosecutorial misconduct in death penalty cases means that, almost universally, the courts
only reverse the judgment if the evidence is weak" and therefore some cases with
prosecutor misconduct that distort the truth-finding process are not reversed).
278. GERSHMAN, supra note 263, at 14-4. ("Several legal doctrines account for this
infrequency: the harmless error rule, the preservation of error requirement, curative
instructions by the judge, and the invited error rule."). Id at 14-3; see also Minsker,
supra note 20, at 397.
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reversal should be granted in misconduct cases if the misconduct had any
impact on the case.279
Often, potential harm from pretrial publicity may be addressed at
trial through change of venue, the voir dire process, and sequestration of
the jury.28° Courts, as in McVeigh, are reluctant to dismiss indictments
because of pretrial publicity.2 81 But in more egregious situations, or
where proper measures are not taken at trial, an appeals court must
reverse a conviction. In Rideau v. Louisiana,282 the Supreme Court
considered a murder case where the defendant's videotaped confession
was played on television prior to trial. The Court reversed the conviction,
noting that the extreme nature of the violation made it unnecessary to
consider what occurred at voir dire.283 Similarly, if a judge's cautionary
instructions at trial would be useless, a mistrial might be the appropriate
remedy.284
Where a defendant has been prosecuted for a capital crime and the
state has sought the death penalty, courts and legislatures must be extra
vigilant in enforcing the policies behind Brady and in deterring other
types of prosecutor misconduct. As discussed earlier, the risk to an
unethical prosecutor that withholding evidence will result in a reversal is
low. At worst, there is a small chance they may have to try the case
again.
279. See Bush, supra note 16, at 225; Gershman, The New Prosecutors, supra note 37,
at 424-32.
280. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); United States v. Coast of Me.
Lobster Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1976).
281. McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1166.
282. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 724.
283. Id. at 726-27.
284. Finally, a prosecutor who violates these ethical obligations might be subject to
civil rights suits or slander suits, as prosecutors only have qualified immunity, not
absolute immunity, for statements made to the press outside the courtroom. Buckley, 509
U.S. at 259; Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1989); Marx v.
Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783 (1 1th Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds by Burns v.
Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991); Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1980);
Stephanian v. Addis, 699 F.2d 1046 (11 th Cir. 1983); Williams v. Gorton, 529 F.2d 668
(9th Cir. 1976); Walker v. Cahalan, 542 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1976). See also Peter J. Boyer,
Civil Liability for Prejudicial Pre-Trial Statements by Prosecutors, 15 AMER. L. REV.
231, 243-44 (1978). "Qualified immunity means that the prosecutor performing a
discretionary function (talking to the press) can avoid liability for civil damages as long
as his conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." H. Morley Swingle, Prosecutors
Beware: Pretrial Publicity May Be Hazardous to Your Career, PROSECUTOR 29, 32
(Sept./Oct. 2001).
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In cases where a prosecutor commits egregious misconduct in a
capital case, courts need to: (1) provide greater deterrence to prosecutors
from committing similar types of misconduct; (2) consider the impact on
the defendant to have to go through repeated capital trials and sentencing
hearings; and (3) prevent the individual prosecutor from committing such
misconduct again. As an example, in a number of cases the U.S. Court of
Appeals addressed repeated prosecutor misconduct by the same
Oklahoma County District Attorney over and over again for fifteen
years.285 Although two cases were reversed based on the prosecutor's
misconduct,286 several other cases found misconduct but did not reverse
because of harmless error analysis.287 So the misconduct continued.288
To deter misconduct in capital cases and to consider the traumatic
experience of innocent defendants prosecuted for capital crimes, once a
prosecutor has withheld exculpatory evidence or committed egregious
misconduct, the case should no longer be a death penalty case.289 If the
case is retried, the prosecutor may seek any available punishment except
the death penalty. To ensure this process is followed, states should pass
laws mandating that the death penalty may not be sought a second time
against a defendant when a prosecutor committed egregious misconduct
in the defendant's previous capital trial, such as where the prosecutor
intentionally withheld exculpatory evidence in prosecuting the case.290
285. See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV. 383, 423
(April 2007) (discussing cases prosecuted by Oklahoma County District Attorney Robert
H. Macy). "In capital case after capital case, Macy uttered litanies of prejudicial remarks
to the jury, mocked the defendant, misstated the law and referred to evidence not in the
record, introduced surprise theories at trial, compared a defendant to Charles Manson,
and engaged in misconduct that was both 'juvenile' and 'intentional and calculated."' Id.
(citations omitted). See also Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1029-30 (10th Cir. 2002)
(Henry, J., concurring) (expressing concern with Macy's misconduct "over the last fifteen
years").
286. See Garrett, supra note 285, at 423 (citing Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197, 1216,
1218 (10th Cir. 1999); McCarty v. Oklahoma, 765 P.2d 1215, 1221-22 (Okla. Crim. App.
1988)).
287. See Hooks v. Oklahoma, 19 P.3d 294, 314 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001); Duckett v.
Oklahoma, 919 P.2d 7, 19 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
288. See Garrett, supra note 285, at 423.
289. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 97 GEO. L.J. 1509 (2009) (arguing that courts may be more willing to
impose sentence reductions as a sanction for misconduct instead of dismissing charges,
resulting in more effective deterrence of misconduct). Recently, the Ninth Circuit upheld
a more extreme remedy in a non-capital case of dismissing an indictment. See Chapman,
524 F.3d at 1079-1090 (upholding district court's dismissal of sixty-four-count
indictment where prosecutor violated Brady by not disclosing 650 pages of documents
including rap sheets, plea agreements, and cooperation agreements with witnesses).
290. Defendants are permitted to "attack ... the thoroughness and even good faith of
the investigation." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 445. Therefore, another remedy that might be
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D. Additional Considerations for Batson Violations
Identifying appropriate remedies or sanctions for deliberate
violations of Batson by unethical capital prosecutors is in some ways
more difficult than doing so for other sorts of prosecutorial misconduct,
such as Brady violations. Determining whether a prosecutor deliberately
used her or his peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors for
prohibited reasons, such as race, is inherently a more subjective
determination than, say, discovering undelivered Brady material in the
possession of the prosecutor. In most cases, given the range of neutral
reasons that a potential juror might be struck, it is relatively easy for a
dishonest prosecutor to identify acceptable reasons for the strike that
have surface plausibility.
Further, the pretrial timing of Batson challenges makes it less likely
that such challenges will result in disciplinary action or other sanctions at
a later date. Batson challenges are raised prior to trial and are subject to
immediate review by the trial judge. So, if the challenge is upheld, the
outcome of the trial will not be affected by the prosecutor's violation of
Batson, and thus there is less reason to pursue disciplinary action or
sanctions at a later date.29'
Ethical remedies have been suggested by some commentators, such
as adding a rule to the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct that
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or national
origin against a member of the venire during jury selection. 292 Some
considered by judges, depending on the case, is for judges to give a jury instruction
during the capital sentencing hearing or capital trial to inform the jurors that the
prosecution previously withheld evidence in the case. Such an instruction would be most
valuable in egregious intentional misconduct cases because a policy of such instructions
would provide an added deterrent to intentional misconduct and would also inform the
jury that there are circumstances that indicate the possibility that other evidence was
withheld. See United States v. Schyllon, 10 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that
intimidation of a single potential witness permits an inference that other witnesses were
also intimidated). Cf State v. Fulminante, 975 P.2d 75, 93 (Ariz. 1999) (stating that no
bad faith is required for instruction regarding state's destruction of exculpatory evidence).
291. Even if the challenge is not upheld, the trial court's rejection of the challenge
would make it more difficult, to prove that the prosecutor deliberately acted in violation
of Batson even after a contrary finding by an appellate court.
292. Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 9, 59-63 (1997) (arguing against personal sanctions for Batson violations, other
than in cases of "flagrantly improper conduct," on the grounds, inter alia, that it would be
difficult to fairly prove the "subjective intent" to discriminate, absent a formal trial of
some sort with full procedural protections, and that the threat of sanction could "dampen
ardent advocacy"). See also Andrew G. Gordon, Note, Beyond Batson v. Kentucky: A
Proposed Ethical Rule Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 62 FORDHAM
L. REV. 685, 713-14 (1993).
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commentators have proposed that the exercise of a discriminatory
peremptory challenge be tied to the ethical rules of the jurisdiction, so
that a pretextual explanation could be cited as a false statement or
misrepresentation to a court. 29 3 The efficacy of any such remedy would,
of course, depend on enforcement of the sanctions by disciplinary bodies
which, as we have noted elsewhere, is problematic at best.
Given that disciplinary action for Batson violations would be more
difficult to achieve than in other misconduct cases, reliance must be
placed on other possible remedies. For one, trial and appellate courts
must be more vigilant in investigating Batson challenges and more
discerning and skeptical in evaluating prosecutors' assertions regarding
neutral reasons for exercising peremptory challenges. The record of the
trial and appellate courts in Miller-El amply illustrates the failure of
some judges adequately to address Batson claims.294
Another possible method for addressing Batson problems that is
embraced by several commentators is affirmative jury selection.295 Under
this procedure, after all challenges for cause, both sides have the right to
include, rather than exclude, jurors on a peremptory basis.296 The judge
seats jurors who were on both lists and, if needed, selects additional
jurors alternatively from the two lists. 297 The essential feature of
affirmative jury selection is "the fundamental principle of deciding who
should be on, rather than who should be off, the jury' 298 and results in
seating as jurors "persons [the defendant] believes would be able to
understand and give effect to his evidence and arguments of mitigation.
They would be a jury of his peers as well as his victim's peers. 2 99
293. Charlow, supra note 292, at 12-14. See also Cavise, supra note 145, at 549. There
are two concerns about such a proposal: (I) such a policy might not work well because
the factual determination necessary for an ethical violation differs from the factual
findings for the pretext finding; and (2) such a policy might discourage judges from
finding a Batson violation for the defendant if they are hesitant to impose professional
consequences on the lawyers.
294. One way to address this failure in the courts would be for Congress to use its
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to impose a robust Batson rule on
all state and federal capital prosecutions.
295. See, e.g., Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury Selection: A Proposal to Advance
Both the Deliberative Ideal and Jury Diversity, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 161, 173-74
(1998); Clem Turner, What's The Story?: An Analysis of Juror Discrimination and a Plea
for Affirmative Jury Selection, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 291-92 (1996); Hans Zeisel,
Affirmative Peremptory Juror Selection, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1165 (1987).
296. Bowers, et al., supra note 158, at 1534-35.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1535.
299. Id.
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Some have suggested a more extreme approach to addressing various
problems with peremptory challenges. In People v. Brown, a non-capital
case, Chief Judge Kaye cited Justice Thurgood Marshall to suggest the
elimination or severe reduction in number of peremptory challenges.3 °°
The rationale she offered included concerns about "the opportunity for
mischief' that peremptory challenges allow.30 1 While Justice Marshall
and Judge Kaye were not necessarily concerned with deliberate
violations of Batson by prosecutors, their suggestion could address some
misconduct concerns because such violations are relatively easy to
conceal, especially when one considers the often lax enforcement of
Batson by lower courts.302 But such a drastic remedy should be treated
with skepticism, and we do not endorse this remedy to address the
Batson problems because such a change would have broader implications
affecting a defendant's right to ajury trial.
A somewhat similar but less drastic approach has been used by a few
courts as a remedy for specific Batson violations. Some courts have held
that when a party uses a peremptory strike in violation of Batson and that
strike is disallowed under Batson, that party forfeits that peremptory
challenge.303 Such a sanction for purposeful discrimination would deter
attorneys from discriminatory use of peremptory challenges and further
the goal of Batson to eliminate racial discrimination in jury selection.30 4
One concern, however, with such an approach is that if applied to
violations by all attorneys, a defendant may be punished for misconduct
by her or his attorney.
Finally, other remedies suggested in this Article in regard to other
types of misconduct, such as barring an offending prosecutor from
300. Brown, 769 N.E.2d at 1272.
301. Id. at 1273.
302. Justice Breyer in Miller-El v. Dretke suggested that the history of that case and
the general failure of Batson to curtail the unconstitutional use of peremptory challenges
indicated the need to confront the choice between the right of a defendant to have a jury
chosen in conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right
to challenge peremptorily, and that the peremptory challenge system as a whole should be
reconsidered. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240 et seq. See also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333,
344 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring). For similar reasons, other commentators have also
suggested the elimination of peremptory challenges. See Melilli, supra note 155, at 503.
303. See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 246 Fed. Appx. 731, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007);
Peetz v. State, 180 S.W.3d 755, 761 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005); People v. Johnson, 765
N.Y.S.2d 199, 201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003). Cf People v. Luciano, 44 A.D.3d 123, 123
(N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that forfeiture of improperly used peremptory strikes
should not have been used as a penalty for Batson violations), appeal pending, 878
N.E.2d 615 (N.Y. 2007).
304. "Since the goal of Batson is the elimination of racial discrimination in jury
selection, it is counterproductive to fail to sanction purposeful discrimination in jury
selection by forfeiting the disputed challenge." Johnson, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
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further involvement in the case, holding prosecutors in contempt, and
precluding the use of the death penalty if the case is retried, should also
be considered as means to deter deliberate violations of Batson in capital
cases. Additionally, as for other types of misconduct, stopping individual
instances of Batson violations is a goal of all ethical prosecutors, so
prosecutor offices should consider specialized training beyond what they
already do in this area.
VII. CONCLUSION: FIVE PROPOSALS TOWARD PREVENTING AND
REMEDYING PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT IN CAPITAL CASES
[A prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done .... It is as
much [the] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one.305
Our adversarial system of justice depends on the competency and
responsibility of the lawyers on both sides of criminal cases. Thus,
responsible prosecutors, courts, and bar organizations must target ways
to deter and prevent instances of misconduct from occurring in capital
cases where the stakes are so high.
The number of prosecutor misconduct cases can be limited by an
added emphasis on training and systemic methods of teaching
prosecutors to deal with the conflicting pressures of handling complex
and emotional capital cases. Lawyers become prosecutors to enforce the
law, not to abuse it, so thorough training is essential. °6 But where the
system breaks down due to misconduct by an individual prosecutor, there
needs to be ways of preventing future violations through the courts and
through the bar.
305. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
306. See Lindsey v. State, 725 P.2d 649, 659 (Wyo. 1986) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting):
The prosecutor.., enters a courtroom to speak for the People and not just some
of the People. The prosecutor speaks not solely for the victim, or the police, or
those who support them, but for all the People. That body of "The People"
includes the defendant and his family and those who care about him. It also
includes the vast majority of citizens who know nothing about a particular case,
but who give over to the prosecutor the authority to seek a just result in their
name.
Id. (quoting On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 537-539 (1986)).
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The easiest way for jurisdictions to eliminate the problem of
prosecutor misconduct in capital cases would be to abolish the death
penalty. 30 7 But if a jurisdiction maintains a death penalty, at a minimum,
we suggest, as a starting point, that every jurisdiction with a death
penalty consider the following five proposals to work to deter further
prosecutor misconduct in capital cases.3 °8
These five proposals are not the only ways to address prosecutor
misconduct in capital cases, and they will not eliminate prosecutor
misconduct. As discussed in the previous section, a number of lawyers
and scholars have made a range of excellent suggestions over the years
for preventing and remedying prosecutor misconduct in criminal cases
generally, and all of those suggestions should be considered. But these
five proposals are presented here as first steps that will be effective in
starting to address some of the major problems in capital cases without a
drastic overhaul of the current legal and disciplinary system.
The five proposals fit in three categories. Because the majority of
prosecutors want to prevent members of their profession from
committing misconduct, the first three proposals recommend that
prosecutors play an essential leadership role in working to further
prevent misconduct by rogue lawyers. The fourth recommendation
provides a deterrent for misconduct in capital cases, and the final general
recommendation encourages courts to address a specific problem.
The first proposal is that prosecutor offices should reevaluate their
training programs for new and long-time capital attorneys regarding
ethics in capital cases and how to deal with pressures to achieve
convictions and death sentences. Offices should do this reevaluation
periodically, and an office should reexamine training procedures
307. See, e.g., John Connor, Death Penalty Drains Justice System Resources, BILLINGS
(Mont.) GAZETrE, March 22, 2009, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-
voices-montana-prosecutor-says-death-penaity-doesnt-keep-correctional-officers-safe
(arguing in article by former chief special prosecutor of Montana that the state should
abolish the death penalty); Jennifer Emily, Prosecutor in One of Dallas County's DNA
Exonerations No Longer Supports Death Penalty, DALLAS (TX) MORNING NEws.COM,
Oct. 3, 2008, available at http://crimeblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2008/10/prosecutor-
in-one-of-the-dna-e.html (discussing Dallas County prosecutor James A. Fry, a former
supporter of the death penalty who is now against the death penalty because of problems
in the criminal justice system); Kirchmeier, supra note 6 (discussing New York
prosecutors critical of the state legislature's decision to pass a death penalty bill).
308. Of course, ethical lawyers are concerned about lawyer misconduct in any type of
case, and some of these proposals might also be considered for non-capital cases. But the
purpose of this Article is to consider ways to prevent and deter instances of egregious
misconduct in capital cases. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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whenever misconduct occurs in the office. As noted above, the ideal
solution is to prevent misconduct from occurring in the first place.
30 9
Second, as discussed above, prosecutor offices should responsibly
evaluate their methods for internal sanctioning of lawyers who behave
improperly in capital cases. Prosecutor offices are uniquely situated for
evaluating misconduct by individual prosecutors in each office.31°
Offices may set up their evaluations in different ways, but one approach
would be to have a special committee made up of a chief ethics officer, a
division head, and a senior prosecutor selected to evaluate the
sanctioning process and to make recommendations for any changes.
Third, courts, prosecutor offices, and ethics committees should
together ensure that prosecutors who egregiously violate ethics rules in
capital cases are not allowed to act as counsel in further capital cases.
Because of the high pressures and high stakes in death penalty cases,
someone who egregiously and intentionally violated ethical rules in a
previous case should not be trusted in another capital case. 311
Fourth, states should pass laws mandating that the death penalty may
not be sought a second time against a defendant when a prosecutor
previously committed egregious misconduct such as intentionally
withholding exculpatory evidence. There are two reasons for such a law.
First, such a law would be the best deterrent against egregious
misconduct because it largely would remove an incentive to withhold
evidence or to commit other types of misconduct. Second, in cases where
there is exculpatory evidence withheld or another type of egregious
misconduct, it would be unfair to subject such a defendant to a second
capital trial after the government misbehaved in the first trial. In such
situations with withheld evidence or egregious misconduct, the defendant
may be not guilty, but even if the defendant is guilty, other severe
punishments, such as life in prison, are available. For the same reasons,
even in the absence of legislative action, courts should be reluctant to
309. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, § 3-2.6 (1993). The standard states: "Training
programs should be established within the prosecutor's office for new personnel and for
continuing education of the staff. Continuing education programs for prosecutors should
be substantially expanded and public funds should be provided to enable prosecutors to
attend such programs." Id.
310. In creating methods for internal sanctions, though, offices should consider how to
filter out baseless complaints by defendants and defense attorneys. One way to limit the
complaints would be to begin with a focus on the most egregious instances of
misconduct.
311. As throughout this Article, the focus here is not on good faith or negligent errors
by attorneys. The concern is that in the occasional instances that involve egregious
intentional misconduct, courts and attorneys need to impose more serious sanctions.
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allow the imposition of death sentences in cases where a prosecutor
previously committed egregious misconduct.
The fifth proposal is that judges should work harder to limit Batson
violations, and courts should experiment with different approaches for
jury selection in capital cases. Because of our country's poor history in
addressing issues of race,312 Batson violations not only create the risk of
unfair trials but also contribute to broader societal problems.313 As
discussed earlier, courts and scholars have made several suggestions for
addressing Batson violations and courts should be more open to trying
new procedures to ensure that capital jurors are not dismissed based upon
discriminatory motives. At a minimum, courts need to work to be
vigilant in guarding the promises made by the Batson decision.
In the American system of justice, the ethical prosecutor plays a
special role as "shepherd of justice" 314 who acts "in the search for truth in
criminal trials. '31 5 Beginning with the decision of whether to seek the
death penalty, capital prosecutors play a powerful role in the capital
punishment system and make life and death decisions. Because some
lawyers are not good shepherds and because of the high stakes when a
prosecutor seeks death, there exists a heightened need to stand vigil
against misconduct in capital cases.
Fortunately, most prosecutors take their legal, ethical, and moral
obligations seriously and they do not strike "foul blows."316 But our legal
system must be better prepared to remedy the situation where a rogue or
vigilante lawyer pursues a death sentence in a way that circumvents
constitutional and ethical rules.317  Hopefully, this Article raises
awareness about the complex issues surrounding prosecutor misconduct
in capital cases. And hopefully courts, bar organizations, prosecutor
offices, ethical prosecutors, and other lawyers will embrace the five
312. See, e.g., FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. and Austin Sarat eds., 2006) [hereinafter
FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE]; Kirchmeier, supra note 6, at 89-100.
313. For example, "[d]ecisions made by all-white juries do not receive the respect of
other racial groups that were denied participation." FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING
STATE, supra note 312, at 225-26.
314. Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D.N.M. 1992).
315. Banks, 540 U.S. at 696. See Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405, 416 (1872) (noting
that a prosecutor's "object like that of the court, should be simply justice; and he has no
right to sacrifice this to any pride of professional success").
316. "But while [a prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones." Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
317. See Hoeffel, supra note 270, 1140-41 (arguing that the adversarial system often
encourages prosecutors to focus on winning the case for the prosecution rather than
seeking justice and also ensuring defendants' rights are protected).
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proposals here as a starting remedy and then continue to work to prevent
and address instances of vigilante misconduct in capital cases.

